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FIRST AMENDMENT ANCILLARY DOCTRINES
DAVID S. BOGEN
INTRODUCTION
A basic premise of the American system of government is that
society may, through the use of designated procedures such as
legislation and constitutional amendment, construct any framework
of law that a sufficient number of the political body acting through
their representatives desire. In order to effectuate this premise, the
first amendment guarantees that the existing government may not
prohibit the expression of any idea because it fears that people will
try to structure society to legitimate that idea.' To guard against
governmental action for such an impermissible purpose, the
Supreme Court uses two basic modes of analysis - categorization
and balancing.2 Where "the harm that the state is seeking to avert is
one that grows out of the fact that the defendant is communicating,
and more particularly out of the way people can be expected to react
to his message,' 3 there is a strong likelihood that the state is acting
out of distaste for the ideas expressed. Governmental action to
suppress such speech is unconstitutional unless the speech falls
* B.A. 1962, LL.B. 1965, Harvard University; LL.M. 1967, New York University;
Professor of Law, University of Maryland.
1. See Bogen, The Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Guarantee of Freedom
of Speech, 35 MD. L. REV. 555 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Bogen].
2. See Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Ely]. But see The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 56, 146 n.30
(1976). The Harvard Law Review footnote suggests that references by the Court to
sustaining governmental regulations that meet "exacting scrutiny," despite encroach-
ment on first amendment protections, signal a rejection of the categorization
technique. However, in applying "exacting scrutiny" the Court still requires that the
governmental interest vindicated be unrelated to the suppression of speech.
Categorization itself involves a similar determination. The indication from the Court,
then, is simply a recognition of the possibility that certain situations may require
further analysis. See the discussion of commercial speech in note 4 infra.
3. Ely, supra note 2, at 1497.
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within certain narrowly defined categories where the presumption
exists that the state's interest is a legitimate one.4 In contrast, when
the harm envisioned by the state would arise "even if the
defendant's conduct had no communicative significance whatever," 5
it is less likely that the state is trying to suppress ideas. Thus, the
less stringent balancing of interests mode of analysis is applicable.
The balancing test focuses upon the significance of the non-speech-
related governmental interest the state advances in support of its
regulation as compared with the degree to which the regulation
impairs expression. Where the governmental interest is slight, it is
likely that the interest was advanced as a pretext for inhibiting
expression or, at the least, that the decisionmaker failed to consider
the value of unimpaired speech in making its determination to
regulate. Both categorization and balancing focus on the legitimacy
of the state's goal. If governmental action is to be upheld under these
tests, the Court must find that the governmental interest is
sufficiently important and sufficiently narrowly defined to justify
the incidental suppression of speech.
4. See id. See also Bogen, supra note 1. At present, the categories are clear and
present danger, obscenity, libel and fighting words. If speech poses a clear and pres-
ent danger of significant illegal action, it is apparent that the government is
concerned with preventing the illegal action itself rather than the dissemination of
any idea that might be associated with such action. Fighting words are perceived as
verbal brickbats, chosen for their capacity to harm rather than to inform. If speech is
obscene, the concern of the state is with the arousal of lust, not with ideas of sex or
with the idea that obscene works should be permissible. If speech is libelous, the
governmental interest is to prevent negligent or willful harm, not to suppress
offensive and untrue statements per se.
Initially, commercial speech was treated as a category of unprotected speech
because it was seen as linked to sales transactions that were subject to regulation. See
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). Recently, the Court has acknowledged
that, on occasion, states regulate commercial speech in order to suppress ideas or
information rather than to protect the consumer from fraud or the public from
disturbance in its enjoyment of public places by time, place or manner restrictions.
See Linmark Assocs. v. Town of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977). As a result,
commercial speech is no longer automatically treated as unprotected speech; instead,
it is subject to a balancing test that focuses upon the governmental interest served by
the regulation. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). As the commercial speech
cases demonstrate, the Court may be forced to take a further look at the categories of
unprotected speech in the rare instance where speech falling into an unprotected
category is regulated for reasons other than the ones that led to its categorization.
Moreover, the categories of unprotected speech are not necessarily closed: if regulation
apparently content-directed may on close investigation be justified by a new
governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of speech, the Court would
presumably uphold it.
5. Ely, supra note 2, at 1497. The concept of "communicative significance" may
be elusive. For example, when prior speech is used as evidence that an individual is
unfit for public office, the harm that is perceived is not whether a listener believed or
acted upon the speech but what the speech reveals about the speaker's likely future
actions. Thus, the harm would arise even if there were no one listening to the speech.
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Either before or in conjunction with its use of categorization or
balancing analysis, the Court is likely to resort to an array of
concepts that result in the invalidation or inapplicability of
particular laws while suggesting that the goal of those laws may be
reached by a redrafted statute. These concepts include prior
restraint, narrow construction of statutes, narrow construction of
delegated powers, pre-emption, overbreadth, vagueness and equal
protection. They are labelled "ancillary doctrines" because they
either depend upon the basic first amendment categorization and
balancing analysis in their application or they are techniques to
avoid the necessity of interpreting first amendment guarantees. The
ancillary doctrines are used in connection with other constitutional
guarantees 6 or, in the case of equal protection, are themselves
constitutional guarantees. But the ancillary doctrines take on special
force when they are applied to problems of free speech.
Where governmental action results in the suppression of
expression and that suppression was foreseeable, it is always
possible that the suppression was a motivating factor in causing the
action to be taken. The basic free speech tests, i.e., categorization
and balancing, determine what governmental interests are sufficient
to overcome the suspicion that suppression of expression motivated
the governmental action. The ancillary doctrines help to ensure that
the government was in fact focusing on its legitimate interests when
it took action affecting free speech. This article will discuss the
Supreme Court's use of the ancillary doctrines to ensure that the
6. Overbreadth has specifically been utilized in due process and equal protection
cases such as Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969), to show that the interest vindicated could be satisfied by a statute that did
not adversely affect such a large class.
Vagueness is frequently used to invalidate criminal statutes that fail to give
sufficient warning of the precise conduct that is prohibited. See, e.g., International
Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216 (1914).
Narrow construction of statutes to avoid constitutional problems has been an
integral part of the Court's decisions even before Justice Brandeis' famous
concurrence in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936), where he
stated:
When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if
a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this
Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly
possible by which the question may be avoided.
Id. at 348 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)). See, e.g., United States v.
Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 407 (1907).
Narrow construction of delegated powers is just one variety of the Ashwander
principle. See Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
Prior restraint has even been considered with respect to status crimes. Cf.
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 679 (1962) (Harlan, J., concurring) (effect of state
court's jury instruction was to authorize criminal punishment for a bare desire to
commit a criminal act).
1978]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
proffered governmental interest was not tainted by the impermissi-
ble consideration of suppression of speech.
I. PRIOR RESTRAINT
Excoriations of the evils of prior restraint as a basic violation of
free speech dot the pages of our history from Milton's Areopagitica7
through Blackstone's Commentaries8 and Holmes' first considera-
tion of free speech in Schenk v. United States.9 The historic concern
over prior restraint of speech arose from systems of censorship that
required pre-publication approval of all manuscripts. The evils
associated with this type of censorship include the following. First, a
larger volume of expression is scrutinized than would be if
subsequent restraints were employed. Second, submission to a third
party delays the publication of all works, even those that could not
possibly be suppressed consistently with the first amendment. Third,
the censor has an interest in finding material to be suppressed in
order to justify his own existence. Thus, he is likely to attempt to
suppress works that would not be prosecuted after publication.
Fourth, systems of prior restraint that involve licensing schemes
lack the normal procedural guarantees of the criminal process. And
finally, suppression before publication may impair the opportunity
of the speaker to appeal to present or future generations for
reconsideration of the propriety of banning his work. Since prior
restraint has a greater effect in hindering or suppressing speech
than would subsequent punishment of unprotected speech, it is
possible that the government might choose such a procedure for that
very reason. Thus, the Court states that there is a presumption
against the constitutional validity of prior restraints. 10
The presumption against the constitutional validity of prior
restraints may be overcome, however, by demonstrating a compel-
ling need for prior rather than subsequent restraints. The Court has
found sufficient justification in three situations. The first situation is
where it is necessary to use a licensing system to allocate the use of
7. "Truth and understanding are not such wares as to be monopolized and
traded in by tickets and statutes and standards. We must not think to make a staple
commodity of all the knowledge in the land, to mark and license it like our broadcloth
and our woolpacks." J. MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 23 (Everyman ed. 1927) (1st ed.
London 1644).
8. "The liberty of the press ... consists in laying no previous restraints upon
publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published." 4
W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151-52.
9. "It well may be that the prohibition of laws abridging the freedom of speech is
not confined to previous restraints, although to prevent them may have been the main
purpose .... " Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1919) (Holmes, J.).
10. E.g., Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971).
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public places. Second, films may be required to be submitted to a
censorship board under strict procedural protections, because the
harm posed by obscene films can be prevented with minimal impact
upon protected speech. Third, injunctions against unprotected
speech may be issued when the material enjoined is so specifically
described that the injunction will not deter protected speech, and
the unprotected speech should clearly be punishable in subsequent
proceedings. The latter two situations involve a determination by the
Court that the impact on protected speech is so slight and so
different from the evils that were imbedded in traditional forms of
prior censorship that it is clear the government's choice of prior
rather than subsequent restraints was mandated by its considera-
tion of the harm done by the unprotected speech and not by its desire
to suppress free speech. The remainder of this section will discuss in
greater detail the three exceptions to the constitutional prohibition
against prior restraint of speech.
An orderly procedure for allocation of the use of public places is
essential to avoid the disruption that simultaneous competing uses
would cause. Speech is enhanced, not restricted, by measures that
enable the authorities to plan for public safety and public services
and prevent the chaos of conflicting uses. In principle, a permit
system for the use of public places facilitates free speech and easily
overcomes the historic presumption against prior restraints.
In practice, however, a permit system for the use of public places
affords the government great opportunities for abuse, i.e., to prohibit
or make difficult the expression of ideas that the licensor dislikes. To
guard against such abuse, the Court, in a series of decisions
beginning with Lovell v. City of Griffin,1 has required that the
licensor's discretion be limited by criteria that are unrelated to the
suppression of speech. "[T]he lack of standards in the license-issuing
'practice' renders that 'practice' a prior restraint in contravention of
the Fourteenth Amendment .... ,,12 Even if the speech itself is
punishable, it cannot be subjected to a standardless permit
requirement. "It is sufficient to say that [a state] cannot vest
restraining control over the right to speak on . . . [particular]
11. 303 U.S. 444 (1938). Lovell also raised issues as to the weight of competing
state interests. This article discusses only the use of a permit system and does not
deal with laws that would prohibit all speech uses in public places, for they are subject
to a balancing test.
12. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 273 (1951). The Court's reference to the
fourteenth amendment, of course, is to the doctrine that the fourteenth amendment
applies to the states the proscriptions that the first amendment applies against
Congress.
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subjects in an administrative official where there are no appropriate
standards to guide his action."' 13
Statutory criteria that use such generalities as "effect upon the
general welfare" are not "appropriate standards" since they permit
the licensor to determine that ideas he dislikes are harmful to the
public.14 A state court, however, may construe a permit statute that
on its face has no criteria or only vague generalities to require
compliance with appropriate standards. After such a construction of
the statute is made, the permit requirement will be upheld by the
Court as constitutional. The Court has also held that such a permit
requirement may constitutionally apply to activities that occurred
prior to the state court's interpretation when the statute has been
administered "in the fair and non-discriminatory manner which the
state court has construed it to require."' 15 Even if the statute was
administered in a discriminatory manner and a permit was denied
for improper reasons, the state may require the applicant to appeal
the denial of a permit to the state courts before engaging in the
prohibited speech when it is clear that the denial violated state law
and the procedures for review are sufficiently expeditious. 16
In Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham,17 the Court invalidated
a conviction for demonstrating without a permit despite a subse-
quent construction of the statute by the Supreme Court of Alabama
that made the statute constitutionally acceptable. When Reverend
Shuttlesworth inquired about a permit, the relevant statute appeared
13. Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 295 (1951). In Niemotko v. Maryland, 340
U.S. 268 (1951), the Court suggested that the refusal to grant the permit was
unjustified by any legitimate criteria, but in Kunz the speaker, in the past, had
ridiculed other religions in such violent terms that Justice Jackson was willing to
label them "fighting words." 340 U.S. at 298-99 (Jackson, J., dissenting). The
majority, however, refused to commit itself on whether the proposed speech would be
punishable, relying on the absence of standards in the permit-issuing process to
invalidate the conviction for speech without a permit. Id. at 294-95.
14. See Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 322-25 (1958).
15. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 577 (1941) (The state court interpreted
the statute when the case was before it on appeal).
16. See Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 408-09 (1953). Poulos involved a
different clause of a section identical to the one construed in Cox v. New Hampshire,
312 U.S. 569 (1941). Thus, although the state court had not construed the clause in
question, its decision in Cox made it clear that it would construe the clause in such a
way as to limit the grounds for denying a permit to those that accord with
constitutional guarantees. Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Poulos emphasized
the expeditious nature of review in New Hampshire. See 345 U.S. at 419-20. The
Court, in Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 155 n.4 (1969), noted
Frankfurter's concurrence in Poulos, which emphasized the expeditious nature of
review in New Hampshire, and also noted Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965),
which enumerates the procedures required for prior restraint of obscenity, discussed at
text accompanying notes 19 to 33 infra.
17. 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
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to invest the local authorities with virtually unlimited discretion and
there were no state decisions to indicate that their authority was
limited. The local authorities in fact administered the statute to deny
permits to groups they disliked. If a later saving construction could
validate a conviction for marching without a permit, there would be
a significant likelihood that the later construction was adopted
specifically for the purpose of upholding the conviction of particular
individuals whose views were unpopular. The invalidation of
Reverend Shuttlesworth's conviction served to ensure that state
court statutory construction will not be influenced by such an
impermissible purpose.
Justice Harlan concurred on the grounds that "neither the city
nor the State provided sufficiently expedited procedures for the
consideration of parade permits .... ,"I In demonstrations for
particular causes, the timing of the protest may be crucial. Thus,
discriminatory administration coupled with slow review procedures
could destroy the effect of the speech. Harlan was anxious to
channel the permit decision into the courts, assuming that a swift
judicial decision would not significantly impede the exercise of
speech. The majority, however, appeared to be reluctant to force an
individual, denied a permit on an unconstitutional basis, to take
further steps that have no assurance of success.
The concern Justice Harlan showed for swift procedure is a
central feature of the Court's treatment of the second area in which
prior restraint of speech has been deemed permissible - state
censorship boards for films. The Court has emphasized that the
basic vices of systems of prior restraint lie in their effect on speech
that cannot be constitutionally suppressed and not in their
prevention of utterances that are subject to punishment. 19 Thus, if
the material to be published is known and judges determine that it is
18. Id. at 164. Harlan does not suggest particular time limits, but he does point
out that "timing is of the essence in politics .... [W]hen an event occurs, it is often
necessary to have one's voice heard promptly, if it is to be considered at all." Id. at
163. Thus, the time frame for a permit system for use of public forums may need to be
more compressed than that established for films.
Last year, the Court reiterated its insistence on prompt review procedures
from permit denials in National Socialist Party v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43
(1977). The Court held that the state must stay any injunction against demonstrating
if it did not provide immediate appellate review. Id. at 44. Justice Rehnquist, joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart, dissented on the grounds that the state
court's denial of a stay was not a final judgment or decree and therefore the Supreme
Court could not properly hear the case. Rehnquist indicated that the original
injunction may have been unconstitutionally overbroad, and did not comment on the
right of the National Socialist Party to demonstrate in the face of an injunction where
the appeal process would be time consuming. Id. at 44-45.
19. See, e.g., Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
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within the definition of obscenity or libel or otherwise unprotected
speech, 20 its publication may be enjoined. If a state attempted to
establish a censorship scheme to review books and magazines, the
historic parallel to traditional censorship would be overwhelming
and the Court would surely strike it down. Films are distinguishable
from printed matter on at least three grounds. First, "[f]or good or ill,
a book has a continuing life. It is passed hand to hand .... "21 In
Kaplan v. California,22 the Court used this as a factor in subjecting
obscene books to censorship, but it also serves to protect the ideas
and values contained in the book. If publication is essential before a
book can be proceeded against, it will have an opportunity to affect
the community that determines its status. Additionally, purchasers
of books usually bring them home. Since the private possession of
obscene material cannot be constitutionally prohibited,23 obscene
material in the form of books can be preserved and given a chance to
resurface in a more receptive climate. 24 The film, however, is more
evanescent; it is shown in a theater to a small group and they cannot
transmit it to others. If the distributor and the theater owner have
their copies of a film seized after its showing, the film will be
effectively destroyed. Thus, requiring a single showing of a film
before it may be censored does not enhance its protection either in
the present or at some later date.
Second, the adage that a picture is worth a thousand words is
particularly applicable to obscenity. Obscenity has been defined, in
part, as works that "depict or describe sexual conduct." 25 Films and
photographs are particularly effective to show acts. Words may be
used to conjure images in the reader's mind and thus may fall within
the definition of obscenity, but pictures eliminate this intervening
step. Additionally, words are the tools of abstract analysis and are
thus more likely to be used to convey ideas. The determination that a
particular book "predominately appeals to the prurient interest" is
20. For a discussion of unprotected speech, see Bogen, supra note 1, at 573-615.
21. Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 120 (1973).
22. 413 U.S. 115 (1973).
23. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
24. The best example of this may be MEMOIRS OF A WOMAN OF PLEASURE by
John Cleland. An illustrated version of the book was the subject of the first recorded
suppression of a literary work in this country. Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass.
336 (1821). But the book, popularly known as Fanny Hill, survived. One hundred
and forty-four years later Massachusetts again banned it. In 1966, the Supreme Court
overturned the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's finding that the book was
obscene. Attorney Gen. v. A Book, 349 Mass. 69, 206 N.E.2d 403 (1965), rev'd, 383 U.S.
413 (1966).
25. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
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likely to be more difficult and subtle than a similar determination
made with regard to a picture. As the Court has stated:
Because of a profound commitment to protecting communi-
cation of ideas, any restraint on expression by way of the
printed word or in speech stimulates a traditional and emotional
response, unlike the response to obscene pictures of flagrant
human conduct. A book seems to have a different and preferred
place in our hierarchy of values, and so it should be.26
Third, the most significant harm resulting from a system of
prior restraint is its capacity to hinder or delay protected expression.
The number of publications, combined with the greater difficulty in
determining their predominant effect, would result in lengthier
delays for printed matter than for films reviewed by a censor board.
Further, while some films are topical, in view of the time involved in
the making, distribution and booking of films, a slight delay in their
showing is likely to have little effect on their timeliness. Thus, where
the delay is brief, it is unlikely the impact of a system of prior
restraint on such works was intended to discourage their production
or in fact operates to do so. The differences in the methods of
distribution, the greater likelihood and effect of obscenity in pictorial
representation and the greater impact of delay inherent in a
reviewing board for printed matter may only be quantitative and not
qualitative. As long, however, as literature is free from prior
restraint, these distinctions and the availability of the written mode
of communicating ideas are likely to persuade the Court that prior
restraints are invoked for films for reasons other than hindering or
suppressing free expression. Even with films, however, intermediate
or preliminary restraints by nonjudicial bodies may have the effect
of suppressing protected speech dealing with sexual or political
matters. To the extent that such temporary suppression is not
absolutely essential to the effective suppression of unprotected
matter, the Court will strike down such prior restraints. 27
Recently, the Court discussed the limitations placed upon prior
restraint of speech in Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,28
wherein it struck down the actions of city officials who refused to
allow the play Hair to be performed in a municipal auditorium.
The presumption against prior restraints is heavier - and the
degree of protection broader - than that against limits on
26. Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119 (1973).
27. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
28. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
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expression imposed by criminal penalties. Behind the distinction
is a theory deeply etched in our law: a free society prefers to
punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they break the
law than to throttle them and all others beforehand. It is always
difficult to know in advance what an individual will say, and the
line between legitimate and illegitimate speech is often so finely
drawn that the risks of freewheeling censorship are formida-
ble.29
The Court refused to pass on whether the production of Hair could
constitutionally be restrained, saying only that the procedures
invoked in the particular case were inadequate.
We held in Freedman, and we reaffirm here, that a system of
prior restraint runs afoul of the First Amendment if it lacks
certain safeguards: First, the burden of instituting judicial
proceedings, and of proving that the material is unprotected,
must rest on the censor. Second, any restraint prior to judicial
review can be imposed only for a specified brief period and only
for the purpose of preserving the status quo. Third, a prompt
final judicial determination must be assured.3°
The rationale for these procedural safeguards was clearly set forth
by the Court:
An administrative board assigned to screening stage produc-
tions - and keeping off the stage anything not deemed
culturally uplifting or healthful - may well be less responsive
than a court, an independent branch of government, to
constitutionally protected interests in free expression. And if
judicial review is made unduly onerous, by reason of delay or
otherwise, the board's determination in practice may be final.31
The dissenters agreed with the procedural requirements imposed on
all systems of prior restraint as enumerated by the majority but did
not agree that the issue of prior restraint was properly before the
29. Id. at 558-59.
30. Id. at 560.
31. Id. at 560-61.
[VOL. 37
ANCILLARY DOCTRINES
Court32 or that the denial of the use of an auditorium was a prior
restraint. 33
The third and final form of permissible prior restraint is the
injunction or court order prohibiting speech. If the speech is subject
to subsequent punishment, the need for some type of prior restraint
against it may be questioned. However, the procedural differences
between injunctions followed by contempt proceedings and criminal
prosecutions for violations of a statute, 34 combined with the "quality
of direct, personal command of the injunction,"35 render the
injunction a more effective method of dealing with undesirable
speech than subsequent punishment. This is true despite the fact
that these same factors may serve to suppress even arguably
protected speech.
Although an injunction to enjoin the publication of specific
obscene material is constitutionally permissible, a general injunction
against publishing obscene or libelous works is unconstitutional. To
the extent the exact language of the speech is unknown, it is
impossible to be certain whether such speech will be defined as
"protected" or "unprotected." Thus, in Near v. Minnesota,36 an order
32. Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger, dissented on the grounds that
the complaint merely sought a declaration that Hair did not violate relevant
ordinances and statutes together with an injunction requiring authorities to make the
municipal facilities available for the show. The dissenters argued that no issue of
prior restraint was raised by these pleadings. Further, they said that since a state
court had in fact passed on the obscenity of the play, the Supreme Court should also
rule on it and uphold the judicial finding that the play violates Tennessee statutes. Id.
at 564-69. Justice Douglas concurred on the ground that the play was constitutionally
protected because all forms of speech, including obscenity, are constitutionally
protected and, thus, procedural deficiencies are irrelevant to a decision. Id. at 563-64.
33. Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, argued that the public auditorium was not a
public forum and that the limits placed on its use by the city were appropriate. Id. at
570-74.
34. The crucial difference may lie in the lack of a jury when the initial
determination is made. Injunctions are issued by judges in equity proceedings without
the aid of a jury, whereas a defendant in a criminal prosecution has a constitutional
right to trial by jury. Additionally, after an injunction has been granted the sole issue
at a contempt proceeding is whether the injunction has been complied with and not
whether the injunction itself was constitutionally valid. Walker v. City of Bir-
mingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967). Thus, even though a jury may be present at a contempt
proceeding, the sole issue it must decide is whether the injunction has been complied
with. See The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 38, 208-09 (1971).
35. See Kalven, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1970 Term - Foreword: Even When a
Nation is at War, 85 HARv. L. REV. 3, 34 n.156 (1971).
36. 283 U.S. 697 (1931). See also City of Madison v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976), wherein the Court stated, with reference to an
order of the Commission prohibiting public employees from speaking at meetings of
the Board of Education on collective bargaining agreements, that "[tihe challenged
portion of the order is designed to govern speech and conduct in the future, not to
punish past conduct and as such it is the essence of prior restraint." Id. at 177.
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to abate publication of libelous utterances was struck down since it
would deter protected as well as unprotected speech.
When the Court first began to consider whether commercial
speech was totally unprotected or was subject to a balancing test,
concern was expressed over the evils of prior restraint in the form of
an injunction with respect to such speech. In Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations,37 the Court upheld, as
applied to sex segregated want-ad columns, a Pittsburgh city
ordinance that forbade discrimination in hiring or aiding such
discrimination. The Court found that the want-ad columns were
unprotected commercial speech. The dissenters, particularly Chief
Justice Burger, complained that the order constituted an unlawful
prior restraint. Burger feared that publishers might not know which
particular ads could be placed in sex segregated columns. 38 The
majority replied to this concern by indicating that the paper could
rely on the representations of the advertiser.39 More importantly, the
majority held the doctrine of prior restraint was inapplicable
because the continuing course of conduct by advertisers gives the
Court sufficient precision in determining what is to be enjoined,
thereby ensuring that only commercial speech is affected by the
order and that no other speech would be deterred. 40 While the column
headings might relate to any number of different ads, the order was
against specific column headings and the forbidden content of the
headings was known.
The preceding discussion has demonstrated the ancillary nature
of the doctrine of prior restraint. The basic test for determining the
constitutionality of a permit system for the use of public places is a
balancing of interests. But unfettered discretion in the permit-giver
is not necessary to accomplish the legitimate aims of allocating
competing uses of public places; therefore, such a permit system is
struck down in the "name of prior restraint." For film censorship
boards, the basic test as to whether speech is punishable or
restrainable is that of categorization, i.e., whether the speech
constitutes obscenity. However, the additional procedural guaran-
tees provided by the doctrine of prior restraint ensure that protected
speech will be affected as little as possible, compatible with the
proscription for unprotected speech.
In the cases discussed, the speech itself was thought to present
the harm that the government could protect against - conflicting
37. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
38. See id. at 396-97 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 390 n.14.
40. Id. at 390.
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use, offensive lust arousal, illegal hiring practices - and the
doctrine of prior restraint was applied to ensure that the procedures
for preventing those harms did no greater damage to speech than
necessary. Governments are also concerned with speech that may
cause the listener to act in a harmful way.
Some variation of the clear and present danger test is normally
applied to speech leading others to act in determining whether such
speech may be prohibited or punished. If the test is applied after the
speech has occurred, the Court has the advantage of knowing the
consequences of that speech. Further, the speech will have had an
opportunity to influence the public so that the jury at trial may sub
silentio weigh the value of that speech against any demonstrable
harm.41 When an attempt is made to enjoin speech that may lead
others to act, the exact language sought to be enjoined is often not
known, so it is difficult to ascertain the seriousness of the danger.
Therefore, before the Court will condone the imposition of a prior
restraint against speech that may cause others to act in a harmful
way, it will demand that a higher degree of danger be present than
that required in the case of subsequent restraints. This additional
demand compensates for the speculative nature of the prediction
that a clear and present danger will result. Thus, in New York Times
Co. v. United States,42 Justice Brennan's concurring opinion
required "proof that publication must inevitably, directly, and
immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling
the safety of a transport already at sea" before the issuance of a
restraining order could be justified.43 And Justice Stewart, joined by
Justice White, demanded a showing that publication "will surely
result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or
its people" before an injunction, not specifically provided for by
Congressional action, should be granted.44 Justices Black and
Douglas were unwilling to allow any prior restraint. 45 The dissen-
ters, Burger, Harlan and Blackmun, focused on the haste of the
decision and the right of the executive to keep its internal
41. The ability of the jury to free a sympathetic defendant despite his flagrant
violation of a law forbidding his speech is embedded in our history. See The Trial of
Mr. John Peter Zenger (1735), reprinted in 17 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE
TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND
MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE PRESENT TIME 675 (T. B. Howell,
compiler, 1813) (account of Mr. Zenger, who published this selection from his own
trial).
42. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Pentagon Papers].
43. Id. at 726-27.
44. Id. at 730.
45. Id. at 714-24.
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communications confidential. Justice Harlan's dissent argued that
when such internal matters touched foreign affairs, the executive
was the proper body for determining the need for secrecy and could
properly secure an injunction against the publication of specific
known material improperly divulged.46 By referring to the manner in
which the material was obtained, the dissent could regard its
position as bearing more upon acts than ideas per se.47
Recently, the Court decided a case that posed almost all of the
dangers that justify concern over prior restraints. In Nebraska Press
Association v. Stuart,48 the Court reversed a Nebraska court order
that prohibited the reporting, prior to the impaneling of a jury, of (a)
the existence and nature of any confessions or admissions made by
the defendant to law enforcement officers or any other third parties
except members of the press, and (b) other facts "strongly
implicative" of the accused. 49 The Nebraska court justified the
issuance of this order on the grounds that it was necessary to ensure
that the accused would be accorded a fair trial.w0
The test traditionally used to determine whether speech
impermissibly interferes with the administration of criminal justice
has been whether the speech presents a "clear and present
danger." 51 The danger feared is that jurors will read or hear certain
material and be influenced to act improperly. A juror cannot
reasonably be punished for his or her psychological inability to
avoid considering what he or she has read or heard, so it is
necessary to punish the speaker. However, in view of the possibility
that the government may be interested in suppressing information
about the trial in order to protect itself from criticism, only a clear
and present danger to the conduct of the trial will justify suppression
of the speech. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court in
Nebraska Press Association, used a variation of the clear and pres-
46. Id. at 756-58 (Harlan, J., Burger, C.J. & Blackmun, J., dissenting).
47. Chief Justice Burger's separate dissenting opinion in Pentagon Papers, 403
U.S. at 752, states that he is not prepared to reach the merits, but the rest of his
opinion emphasizes "unauthorized possession" of "purloined documents", and he
analogizes the government's action here to that of the Court attempting to keep its
deliberations secret. Id. at 752 n.3. This emphasis on the unauthorized possession of
the documents is missing from Harlan's dissent, in which Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Blackmun joined, but it is not inconsistent with that dissent. A doctrine of
executive control over the release of internally prepared information explains the
apparent inconsistency between Burger's views on prior restraint in Organization for
a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971), and his dissent in Pentagon Papers.
48. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
49. Id. at 545.
50. Id.
51. E.g., Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962). See Bogen, supra note 1, at 571
n.58.
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ent danger test as stated by Judge Learned Hand and affirmed on
appeal in Dennis v. United States5 2 - whether "the gravity of the
'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger. '5 3
The application of this test is quite different, however, when the
attempt to suppress speech endangering a fair trial is made by a
prior restraint rather than a subsequent one. There are a number of
reasons for more stringent review of prior as opposed to subsequent
restraints. First, a prior restraint deprives the court of the advantage
of observing the consequences of the speech. For example, in
Nebraska Press Association, if the press had reported the defend-
ant's confession, and the defendant was found innocent by the jury,
the publication of the confession would not appear to have posed a
clear and present danger to the administration of justice in that
case. Of course, a guilty finding would not conclusively prove the
jurors were improperly influenced, so some degree of speculation is
inherent in the situation. The speculative nature of the harm was
emphasized by Chief Justice Burger who noted that the trial judge's
"conclusion as to the impact of such publicity on prospective jurors
was of necessity speculative, dealing as he was with factors
unknown and unknowable."5 4
Second, a prior restraint prevents the speech from influencing
the public. If the speech is permitted to reach the public, a jury could
weigh the value of the speech against the harm that might arise
from the speech and determine that the value of the speech
outweighs any demonstrable harm. This is in part the concern that
Justice Brennan voiced in his concurrence when he stated, "'the
procedures do not require attention to the safeguards of the criminal
process; the system allows less opportunity for public appraisal and
criticism .... , ,55
Third, the terms of a prior restraint order may forbid or deter
expression that poses no serious danger. The provision in the
Nebraska order forbidding reporting of facts "strongly implicative"
of the accused was subject to this criticism. Thus, the Court found
that in addition to other defects in the order, this particular
provision was too vague to be enforceable.56
Fourth, the dynamics of any system of prior restraint may lead
to excesses. The Court has attempted to guard against administra-
52. 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951).
53. 427 U.S. at 562.
54. Id. at 563.
55. Id. at 589-90 (quoting T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
506 (1970)).
56. Id. at 568.
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tive schemes5 7 of prior censorship but, as Justice Brennan points out,
the system in the Nebraska Press Association case posed similar
dangers.
In order to minimize pretrial publicity against his clients and
pre-empt ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, counsel for
defendants might routinely seek such restrictive orders. Prosecu-
tors would often acquiesce in such motions to avoid jeopardizing
a conviction on appeal. And although judges could readily reject
many such claims as frivolous, there would be a significant
danger that judges would nevertheless be predisposed to grant
the motions, both to ease their task of ensuring fair proceedings
and to insulate their conduct in the criminal proceeding from
reversal.5 8
Finally, a prior restraint on speech has the immediate impact of
preventing the speech from occurring, whereas "[a] criminal penalty
or a judgment in a defamation case is subject to the whole panoply
of protections afforded by deferring the impact of the judgment until
all avenues of appellate review have been exhausted."5 9 As occurred
in Nebraska Press Association, a prior restraint may suppress
speech at the very time when public interest is at its peak and the
likelihood of public criticism of institutional performance is greatest.
The suppression of speech that results from a prior restraint, even
when the restraint is subsequently ruled improper, may render the
speech less effective.
For these reasons, the concurring Justices Brennan, Stewart and
Marshall would confine prior restraints to the recognized exceptions
"in which the 'speech' involved is not encompassed within the
meaning of the First Amendment" 60 and possibly to those situations
in which there is a showing that publication "'will surely result in
direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its
people' ",61 or "'proof that publication must inevitably, directly, and
immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling
the safety of a transport already at sea . . . "62 Even in these
situations, careful procedural safeguards must be adhered to so that
57. For a discussion of permit systems for public assemblies and films, see notes
11 to 27 and accompanying text supra.
58. 427 U.S. at 607-08 (Brennan, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 559.
60. Id. at 590.
61. Id. at 593 (quoting Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring)
(emphasis supplied in Nebraska case)).
62. Id. (quoting Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 726-27 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(emphasis supplied in Nebraska case)).
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protected speech is not unnecessarily suppressed, even temporarily. 63
Justices White and Stevens, in their separate concurrences, stated
that they were not yet ready to join Justice Brennan in establishing
an absolute rule governing prior restraints. However, they did
intimate that if they were forced to face the issue squarely at some
later date, they may adopt the Brennan formula. 64
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, draws back from
such an absolute rule. "However difficult it may be, we need not rule
out the possibility of showing the kind of threat to fair trial rights
that would possess the requisite degree of certainty to justify
restraint."6 5 But the majority opinion may not be as far from the
Brennan concurrence as the language of the opinions suggests.
Justice Brennan apparently believed that the majority had taken an
ad hoc balancing approach to determine whether the state's
justification for prior restraint overcame the presumption against
prior restraints. Yet the case before the Court was not one where
balancing would be appropriate even if subsequent restraints were
involved.66 If the speech possessed the requisite certainty that it
would destroy a fair trial and no adequate alternatives to protect the
trial existed, the Court might find that the words "'have all the
effect of force."' 6 7 The concurrence of Justice Brennan attempts to
show that sufficient alternatives to prior restraint exist so that
direct, immediate and irreparable harm would never be present,
while Chief Justice Burger merely leaves open the unlikely
possibility that such harm could be proven. Burger does not suggest
that prior restraints could be applied to speech that could not be
subsequently punished or for which subsequent punishment would
be an adequate protection of the legitimate governmental interest
involved.
63. Id. at 591 (Brennan, J., concurring). Although Brennan's requirement of
adequate and timely procedures to ensure that protected speech is not restrained was
mentioned only with regard to the prior restraint of speech that is not encompassed
within the meaning of the first amendment, it seems certain that those same
requirements would be required with regard to the prior restraint of publications that
might endanger the national security. For a discussion of those requirements, see text
at notes 28 to 33 supra.
64. Id. at 570-71 (White, J., concurring); id. at 617 (Stevens, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 569-70. In 1977 the Court again struck down an injunction by a trail
court against publication of a matter concerning the trial. In Oklahoma Publishing
Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (per curiam), the lower court had enjoined the
publication of the name and picture of a juvenile involved in a detention hearing. The
unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court was based primarily on Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). It reversed the decision below because the juvenile
had, in effect, a public hearing.
66. The issue was the impact of publicity on the defendant's right to a fair trial;
therefore, the cle'ar and present danger test was the appropriate standard.
67. 427 U.S. at 590 (quoting Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931)).
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II. AVOIDANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS
The doctrine of prior restraint is the leading example of "first
amendment 'due process'." 68 The doctrine focuses on procedures that
affect speech - such as censorship boards and the issuance of
licenses - and may invalidate those procedures as unconstitutional
without determining the constitutionality of other substantive
measures that punish the same speech. However, the Court can
guard against unwarranted infringement upon free speech without
declaring that a constitutional violation has occurred. It does this by
interpreting a statute or regulation so as to avoid a confrontation
with the constitution. Interpretation of law to avoid conflict with
basic principles has a long history in other countries.69 In the United
States, the Supreme Court has utilized this precept of statutory
construction in its protection of first amendment guarantees by
construing statutes to be inapplicable to the expression of ideas and
by finding that officials have not been delegated the authority to act
in a manner that would suppress speech.
A. Narrow Construction of Statutes
When a federal statute is susceptible to more than one
construction, the Court, on numerous occasions, has rejected any
construction that would result in interference with free speech and
adopted a construction that avoids such interference. For example,
the National Labor Relations Act declares that it shall be an unfair
labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to threaten,
coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce where the object
of such action is to force that person to cease doing business with
another.70 There is an exemption in the statute for
publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully
advising the public, including consumers and members of a
labor organization, that a product or products are produced by
an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary
dispute and are distributed by another employer, as long as such
68. See Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARV. L. REV. 518,
518-19 (1970). Monaghan discusses other procedural concerns, in addition to prior
restraint, particularly requirements for prompt judicial review, see id. at 532-51, and
the abstention doctrine, see id. at 543-49. This article, like Monaghan's, does not
attempt to review every conceivable context in which the legitimacy of the procedures
used by the government should be affected by the first amendment, but only to
suggest by a discussion of the leading area the relevance of the first amendment to
the procedures used.
69. A. V. DICEY, THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 62-63 (10th ed. 1959).
70. Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1970). This portion of the Act
is known as the secondary picketing provision.
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publicity does not have an effect of inducing any individual
employed by any person other than the primary employer in the
course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or
transport any goods, or not to perform any services, at the
establishment of the employer engaged in such distribution.71
One might infer from this proviso exempting consumer publicity
other than picketing from the reach of the statute that the statute
prohibits all consumer picketing designed to force one employer to
stop dealing with another. But when such picketing is aimed at only
one of many products sold by the employer whose location is
picketed, the picketing may fail to have any coercive effect. If the
statute were interpreted to prevent this type of picketing, it would
raise serious problems under the first amendment.7 2
In NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen Local
760,7 3 the Court held that the ban on secondary picketing found in
the National Labor Relations Act did not apply to picketing that
requested consumers not to buy apples in a particular grocery
store.74 As the dissenters demonstrated, an examination of the
language and history of the specific clauses in question suggests
that such picketing was prohibited. 75 Yet the majority's concern over
first amendment guarantees 76  caused the Court to avoid the
71. Section 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1970).
72. Such picketing would not suggest opposition to consumer entrance into the
store. Once inside the store, consumers are free to purchase the picketed product
without interference from the picketers. Refusal to purchase the picketed product,
therefore, would be based on the consumers' agreement with the non-coercive request
of the picketers. See Note, Political Boycott Activity and the First Amendment, 91
HARV. L. REV. 659, 682 n.128, 683 (1978). Justice Black viewed such picketing as
covered by the National Labor Relations Act, but protected by the first amendment.
See NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen Local 760, 377 U.S. 58,
76-80 (1964) (Black, J., concurring).
73. 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
74. Id. at 63.
75. Id. at 82-92 (Harlan & Stewart, JJ., dissenting). Justices Harlan and Stewart
would have upheld the ban on all consumer picketing at secondary stores because
picketing has effects beyond simple communication. Even under the circumstances of
this case, Harlan said: "Because of the very nature of picketing there may be numbers
of persons who will refuse to buy at all from a picketed store, either out of economic or
social conviction or because they prefer to shop where they need not brave a picket
line." Id. at 82-83.
76. Justice Black, concurring, agreed with the dissent that the picketing was
forbidden by the Act, but concluded that such a prohibition would violate the first
amendment. Id. at 76.
[W]e have neither a case in which picketing is banned because the picketers
are asking others to do something unlawful nor a case in which all picketing
is, for reasons of public order, banned. Instead, we have a case in which
picketing, otherwise lawful, is banned only when the picketers express
particular views. The result is an abridgement of the freedom of these
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prohibition by narrowly construing the statute.77 As the majority
stated:
Throughout the history of federal regulation of labor relations,
Congress has consistently refused to prohibit peaceful picketing
except where it is used as a means to achieve specific ends which
experience has shown are undesirable.. . . We have recognized
this congressional practice and have not ascribed to Congress a
purpose to outlaw peaceful picketing unless "there is the clearest
indication in the legislative history," . . . that Congress
intended to do so as regards the particular ends of the picketing
under review. Both the congressional policy and our adherence
to this principle of interpretation reflect concern that a broad
ban against peaceful picketing might collide with the guarantees
of the First Amendment. 78
Another case in which the Court narrowly construed a statute to
avoid a confrontation with first amendment guarantees is Eastern
Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.79 In
that case, the railroad conference had engaged in a massive
publicity campaign to procure legislation to improve their competi-
tive position against the trucking industry. The truckers brought
suit, claiming that the actions of the conference constituted a
conspiracy to restrain trade and monopolize the long-distance
freight business in violation of the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court
held that the Act did not apply to associations in their efforts to
influence the passage of legislation or the enforcement of laws:
"[Sluch a construction of the Sherman Act would raise important
constitutional questions. The right of petition is one of the freedoms
protected by the Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of course, lightly
impute to Congress an intent to invade these freedoms." 80
picketers to tell a part of the public their side of a labor controversy, a subject
the free discussion of which is protected by the First Amendment.
Id. at 79.
77. Id. at 62-63.
78. Id. (emphasis added).
79. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
80. Id. at 138. Another example of statutory interpretation to avoid constitutional
problems is Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). The Court, in an opinion
written by Justice Harlan, held that the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1952) (amended
1956 & 1962), prohibited advocacy directed at promoting unlawful action but not
advocacy of abstract doctrine. 354 U.S. at 318-19. The Court stated, "[w]e need not,
however, decide the issue before us in terms of constitutional compulsion, for our first
duty is to construe this statute. In doing so, we should not assume that Congress
chose to disregard a constitutional danger zone so clearly marked ...." Id. at 319.
Four years later, the Court determined that the clause in the Smith Act that
prohibited knowing membership in an organization that advocates the overthrow of
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Recently, in Buckley v. Valeo,81 the Court once again engaged in
narrow construction of a statute in order to avoid a conflict with the
first amendment. In Buckley, the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971 limited the amount of contributions and expenditures that
individuals and groups could make in federal elections, and required
disclosure of such sums. The definition of both "contributions" and
"expenditures" included things of value "made for the purpose of
influencing" the nomination or election of any person to federal
office. A general discussion of issues on which candidates have
taken a stand may influence an election, but it would be particularly
difficult to draw the line on when discussion of issues is for the
purpose of influencing the election of specific persons. A broad
reading of the language of the statute would prevent persons from
avoiding the impact of the disclosure and limitation provisions of
the law by concealing their support of a candidate in a forceful
discussion of issues on which the candidate's stand is widely known.
It would also prevent expenditures to urge or discuss ideas about
issues, thereby presenting a serious conflict with the first amend-
ment. The Court concluded:
To insure that the reach of § 434(e) [the disclosure requirement]8 2
is not impermissibly broad, we construe "expenditure" for
purposes of that section ... to reach only funds used for
communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of
a clearly identified candidate. This reading is directed precisely
to that spending that is unambiguously related to the campaign
of a particular federal candidate.8 3
Additionally, such a construction would raise serious problems of
vagueness, as will be discussed in Section V.84 Thus, the per curiam
opinion of the Court stated, "[w]here the constitutional requirement
the government of the United States by force or violence was properly construed to
reach only "active" members who had the specific intent to further the organization's
unlawful ends, not "passive" members. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 220-23
(1961). In Scales, the Court affirmed the petitioner's conviction, but on the same day it
also reversed a conviction under the Smith Act for insufficient evidence of illegal
advocacy. See Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961).
81. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
82. 2 U.S.C. § 434(e) (Supp. IV 1974) requires that every person, other than a
political committee or candidate, who makes contributions or expenditures of more
than $100 during one calendar year other than by a contribution to a political
committee or candidate, must file a statement with the Federal Election Commission.
83. 424 U.S. at 80 (footnotes omitted). The Court also used narrow construction to
preserve § 608(e)(1) (which provided that no person can make expenditures to a clearly
identified candidate, during one calendar year, which exceeds $1,000) against attacks
on its vagueness; but ultimately struck it down under a balancing test. Id. at 43-51.
84. See pp. 714-26 infra.
1978]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
of definiteness is at stake, we have the further obligation to construe
the statute, if that can be done consistent with the legislature's
purpose, to avoid the shoals of vagueness."8 5
Last year, in United States v. Ramsey,8 6 the Court had an
opportunity to narrowly construe a statute in order to avoid a
potential conflict with the first amendment, but declined to do so.
The Court was confronted with a statute that granted officers or
persons authorized to board or search vessels the authority to
"search any trunk or envelope, wherever found, in which he may
have a reasonable cause to suspect there is merchandise which was
imported contrary to law .... "87 Justice Stevens, joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall in dissent, maintained that the word
"envelope" in the statute should be narrowly construed so as to refer
to bulky packages only; not to letters.88 Justice Stevens emphasized
that the opening of private letters without notice to either the sender
or the addressee "is abhorrent to the tradition of privacy and
freedom to communicate protected by the Bill of Rights." 89 Thus,
[W]hen action taken by an inferior governmental agency was
accomplished by procedures which raise serious constitutional
questions, an initial inquiry will be made to determine whether
or not "the President or Congress, within their respective
constitutional powers, specifically has decided that the imposed
procedures are necessary and warranted and has authorized
their use."9
Justice Stevens argued, from the legislative history of the statute in
question, that no such specific determination as to letters was made
and, therefore, the statute should not be interpreted to reach letters.91
The majority, however, believed that any effect that searches
authorized by the statute might have on speech would come from the
possibility that correspondence would be seen. 92 Postal regulations
"flatly prohibit, under all circumstances, the reading of correspon-
dence absent a search warrant .... -93 Under these circumstances,
the Court found no significant effect on free speech and therefore did
85. 424 U.S. at 77-78.
86. 431 U.S. 606 (1977).
87. 19 U.S.C. §482 (1970).
88. 431 U.S. at 628-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 626 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 632 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420,
430 (1960)).
91. See id. at 627, 630.
92. See id. at 623-24.
93. Id. at 623.
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not feel compelled to construe the statute so as to avoid constitu-
tional issues. 94
B. Narrow Construction of Delegated Powers
Closely related to the principle of narrowly construing statutes is
the principle of narrowly construing congressionally delegated
powers. By narrowly construing congressionally delegated powers
the Court may determine that a particular administrative action was
not authorized by Congress, thereby mooting the question of
whether such action was in contravention of first amendment
guarantees. The Court utilizes this principle of narrow construction
not only where Congress has expressly forbidden the administrative
action in question or such action is clearly not in furtherance of the
legislation cited as authority, but also in situations where the
administrative action would be consistent with a broad delegation of
power.
In Kent v. Dulles,95 regulations of the Secretary of State forbade
the issuance of a passport to Communists. Congress had authorized
the Secretary of State to grant and issue passports under such rules
as the President shall designate and prescribe. The Court held that
such authorization was insufficient for the promulgation of the rules
involved in that case.96
Where activities or enjoyment, natural and often necessary to
the well-being of an American citizen, such as travel, are
involved, we will construe narrowly all delegated powers that
curtail or dilute them.... We hesitate to find in this broad
generalized power an authority to trench so heavily on the rights
of the citizen.97
94. Id. at 624.
95. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
96. The Secretary of State was authorized to grant and issue passports under a
1926 statute. Prior to 1926, administrative practice had usually limited the issuance of
passports in only two situations, neither related to the political beliefs of the
applicant. From this, the Court determined that Congress did not intend to grant the
Secretary of State unlimited discretion in deciding who should be issued a passport.
Id. at 129-30.
97. Id. at 129. Although the Court focused on the right to travel as the
constitutional right jeopardized by the regulations issued by the Secretary of State, it
was clearly influenced by the effect that the statute and the regulations had on free
speech. As the Court stated, "We deal with beliefs, with associations, with ideological
matters." Id. at 130. Several years after the Kent decision, the Court invalidated a
statute that specifically prohibited the application for a passport by a Communist.
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964). In Aptheker, the Court stated that
freedom of travel is a constitutional liberty closely akin to rights of free speech and
association, id. at 517, and applied standards of review utilized in first amendment
cases. The Court stated that "the proper approach" for review came from NAACP v.
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The Court recognized that the function of narrowly construing a
congressional delegation of power is the familiar one of avoiding
constitutional questions by statutory construction.
We would be faced with important constitutional questions were
we to hold that Congress by § 1185 and § 211a had given the
Secretary authority to withhold passports to citizens because of
their beliefs or associations. Congress has made no such
provision in explicit terms; and absent one, the Secretary may
not employ that standard to restrict the citizens' right of free
movement.98
The Court utilized the principle of narrow construction again in
Schneider v. Smith.99 Congress enacted the Magnuson Act which
authorized the President to issue rules and regulations to safeguard
all vessels in the territories or waters subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States against injury from sabotage or other subversive
activity when the President determined that the security of the
United States was endangered by reason of such activity. 1°°
Pursuant to the Act, the President issued regulations that gave the
Commandant of the Coast Guard the authority to withhold the
validation of permits to work on United States merchant vessels
"unless he is satisfied that 'the character and habits of life of [a
seaman] are such as to authorize the belief that the presence of the
individual on board would not be inimical to the security of the
United States."' 101 The Commandant required applications for
permits to include a questionnaire regarding the applicant's
associations with listed organizations. The appellant stated that he
had never advocated the overthrow of the Government by unconsti-
tutional means, but refused to go into detail about membership in
the listed organizations. The Court held that the broad inquiry into
associations with organizations listed on the application form was
not authorized by the statute.
When we read that delegation with an eye to First Amendment
problems, we hesitate to conclude that Congress told the
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) and Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), both of
which utilized the first amendment to invalidate governmental action. See 378 U.S. at
516-17. In Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965), the Court upheld administrative decisions
by the Secretary of State that declared U.S. passports invalid for travel to Cuba. In
determining that the Secretary's decisions were consonant with the authority
delegated to him by statute, the Court noted that Kent and Aptheker involved free
speech claims - claims that did not exist in Zemel. See id. at 16.
98. 357 U.S. at 130.
99. 390 U.S. 17 (1968).
100. Id. at 18.
101. Id. at 19 (quoting Navigation and Navigable Waters, 33 C.F.R. §§6.10-1,
-3 (1968)).
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Executive to ferret out the ideological strays in the maritime
industry. The words it used - "to safeguard.. . from sabotage
or other subversive acts" - refer to actions, not to ideas or
beliefs. We would have to stretch those words beyond their
normal meaning to give them the meaning the Solicitor General
urges. Rumely [United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953)], and
its allied cases, teach just the opposite - that statutory words
are to be read narrowly so as to avoid questions concerning the
"associational freedom" that Shelton v. Tucker [364 U.S. 479
(1960)] protected and concerning other rights within the purview
of the First Amendment.102
At least one function of the doctrines of narrow construction of
statutes and narrow construction of congressionally delegated
powers so as to avoid constitutional issues is to ensure that Congress
is fully aware of the implications of its actions in curtailing speech.
The doctrine seeks to require Congress to make a considered decision
that the exigencies of the potential danger require such a law. While
the Court may be willing to uphold a law that suppresses speech
because the law is aimed at protecting a legitimate governmental
interest unrelated to such suppression, the Court must be assured
that the government does indeed have such an interest.
III. PRE-EMPTION
Another ancillary doctrine used by the Court to strike down
legislation impairing speech without directly referring to the first
amendment is pre-emption, i.e., the doctrine that federal legislation
in an area, or the "federal nature" of the area itself, bars state action
in that area. The Court's use of the pre-emption doctrine is
epitomized in Pennsylvania v. Nelson,0 3 wherein the defendant was
convicted under a state sedition act of knowing advocacy of the
overthrow of the government of the United States by force and
violence. The Supreme Court held that the enactment of the Federal
Smith Act 04 superseded all state laws on sedition against the federal
government although the federal statute did not expressly so state.
The Court argued that the pervasiveness of the federal legislation
indicated that no scope of action was left to the state, that the nature
of the problem was one in which the federal interest was dominant
and that the enforcement of the state law could conflict with the
administration of the federal program.
102. 390 U.S. at 26-27.
103. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
104. 18 U.S.C. §2385 (1952) (amended 1956 & 1962).
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The first amendment overtones of the pre-emption doctrine
surfaced again in Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin.05 Austin
involved statements in a newsletter, published by a federal public
employee union, naming persons who had not joined the union and
calling such persons "scabs" and then referring to scabs in scathing
terms. Certain of the named individuals sued for libel under state
law. States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of
liability for defamation of a private individual, as long as they do
not impose liability without fault. 106 The Court, however, held that
statements made in the course of a labor dispute were governed by a
federal policy that established union elections in the postal service
and sought to foster free debate and discussion during those
elections. 10 7 Thus, the Court held that state libel law could only
apply to statements made with "'knowledge that [the statements
were] false or with reckless disregard of whether [such statements
were] false or not' '"108 and reversed the judgments. 10 9 Justice
Douglas concurred on the basis that state libel laws are unconstitu-
tional." 0 Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist in dissent, argued that there was no pre-emption because
no real labor dispute existed in the case. 11
By using the doctrine of pre-emption, the Court may sometimes
avoid facing first amendment constitutional problems by asserting
that congressional action bars or partially bars state action in a
particular area. Such a decision permits Congress, through legisla-
tion, to expressly allow state action in that area, but again it forces
Congress to reflect on the need for such legislation in view of its
impact on speech.
105. 418 U.S. 264 (1974).
106. See Gertz v. Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
107. 418 U.S. at 273-75.
108. Id. at 281 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964)).
109. In support of its position, the Court cited Linn v. Plant Guard Workers Local
114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966), wherein it was held that libel actions under state law were pre-
empted by federal labor laws (the NLRA) to the extent that the state sought to make
actionable those defamatory statements made during the course of labor disputes that
were published without knowledge of the falsity of such statements or without
reckless disregard for the truth of such statements. See id. at 64-65. In Austin, the
relevant federal law was Executive Order No. 11491 rather than the NLRA.
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the same federal policies were applicable and
extended the Linn rationale to cover federal employees. See 418 U.S. at 273-79.
110. See id. at 289-91. Justice Douglas also offered a narrower basis for decision:
"the pre-emptive effect of federal labor regulation is such that States are prohibited
from interfering with those federally regulated relations by arming disputants in
labor controversies with an arsenal of defamation laws." Id. at 288.
11L. Id. at 294-95.
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IV. OVERBREADTH
Constitutional confrontation may not always be avoided. In
some instances, state courts have already construed a state statute
in a way that makes conflict with first amendment principles
inevitable. 112 In other instances, there is no coherent alternative
interpretation which in a single case would avoid constitutional
problems.113 The Court may then be faced with a statute that might
properly apply to a variety of situations constitutionally subject to
regulation, but which also restricts speech clearly protected by the
first amendment. In such a situation, the Court may hold that a
particular application is unconstitutional, but preserve the statute
for use against unprotected conduct. 114 In the alternative, the Court
may invalidate the entire statute on the ground of "overbreadth."
If the Court chooses to consider the overbreadth of a statute, it
will evaluate the law on its face rather than as it is applied in the
case before it. Thus, application of overbreadth is an exception to
traditional rules of standing which ordinarily permit a litigant to be
heard only when he asserts that a statute violated his own rights.15
Under overbreadth analysis a defendant may challenge the facial
validity of a statute even though his own conduct could be
constitutionally proscribed by a more narrowly drawn statute. In
essence the defendant is asserting the rights of hypothetical
defendants whose constitutionally protected expression would be
punished under the statute. The rationale supporting this extension
of standing is the Court's determination "that the possible harm to
society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is
outweighed by the possibility that protected speech of others may be
muted and perceived grievances left to fester because of the possible
inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes."116
Overbreadth is here referred to as an "ancillary" doctrine of the
first amendment because it is applied only when a court finds that at
least some particular applications of a statute are unconstitutional
under other first amendment tests. A law that is overbroad, like any
other law improperly regulating speech, deters the expression of
112. See Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974). See also Coates v. City
of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
113. See Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844,
862-63 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Overbreadth Doctrine]. See also U.S. v. Robel, 389
U.S. 258 (1967).
114. Cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (particular conviction under
common law offense held unconstitutional). See also Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.
601, 613-14 (1973).
115. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1972).
116. Id.
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ideas. The overbroad law, however, also functions to regulate
conduct that a state may legitimately control. The particular
problem with the overbroad law is that there is no way in a single
case to sustain the law for its legitimate applications, while at the
same time preventing it from unconstitutionally restricting expres-
sion. The overbroad statute represents two sets of competing
interests; the public's interest in regulating improper conduct
juxtaposed against the public's interest in free expression. If a court
declares that a law is fatally overbroad, it has decided that the
public's interest in free expression must prevail.
One area where resolution of these conflicting interests clearly
favors speech and thus one where overbreadth analysis is particu-
larly appropriate, involves statutes creating schemes imposing civil
disabilities - such as denial of public employment or a professional
license - on the basis of specified kinds of speech or associational
activity. The purpose of civil disability schemes is to protect the
public by preventing one whose background or beliefs indicate the
possibility of misbehavior from obtaining a position of significance
within the community. Such schemes often create a strong chilling
effect on speech when the set of disfavored beliefs or behaviors is
broader than is necessary to protect the public.
Case-by-case adjudication of the constitutionality of these
schemes would be inappropriate for several reasons. First, the
legislature's purpose in enacting civil disability statutes is to create
a system of automatic disqualification which eliminates the process
of case-by-case adjudication. 1 7 An attempt to save the statute by
holding only particular applications unconstitutional would frus-
trate its design. Overbreadth invalidation that remits the whole
matter for the consideration of the lawmaking body is more
appropriate. Second, overbreadth invalidation of such broad laws
does not leave the government powerless to protect itself. Unlike the
invalidation of criminal statutes that would result in freeing many
who are properly subject to criminal penalty, with no possibility of
ever punishing them because of ex post facto problems, the
elimination of overbroad schemes for screening employees or
professionals does not prevent immediate ad hoc screening. If
someone failed to get a job because of the overbroad rule, the
enactment of valid qualifying standards may still keep him from
such a position."" Since the state's interest in regulating undesirable
117. See Overbreadth Doctrine, supra note 113, at 880-82.
118. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957) (an applicant could not be
denied admission on the grounds stated) and Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36
(1961) (affirming the denial of bar admission to the same man on grounds that failure
to answer questions obstructed investigation into his qualifications).
[VOL. 37
ANCILLARY DOCTRINES
behavior remains satisfied, it is not surprising that much of the law
on overbreadth was developed in the course of evaluating laws of
this type. In these cases the crucial question is whether the broad
sweep of the statute is necessary to protect the legitimate interests of
the government. If it is, then all applications of the statute are
legitimate and the law will be upheld. If the law affects speech not
indicative of future misbehavior, it is overbroad. Ultimately, when it
evaluates the alleged overbreadth of civil disability schemes, the
Court must determine when broad regulation is justified. The Court
makes this determination through the use of the balancing test.119
119. Extended discussion of this point will be deferred for treatment in a
subsequent article on the Court's use of balancing analysis in the first amendment
context. Briefly, at one extreme, a law forbidding particular positions to all who
disagree with any government policy might have an incremental effect in keeping
from such employment persons who would deliberately frustrate governmental
operations. That incremental effect, however, would be quite small and utterly
insignificant when weighed against the impact such a law would have upon free
speech. Patently, a law of this kind would be designed to suppress speech that
expresses disagreement with government policy rather than to protect the efficiency
of governmental operations. Every member of the Court would likely join in striking
down such a law. At the other extreme, a law forbidding particular positions to those
who admit they would use their position to destroy the government would clearly
protect legitimate governmental interests. Its purpose would be to deal with
threatened conduct and not to suppress ideas. Such a law would be sustained
unanimously.
Most laws, however, fall somewhere between these extremes. When the
Justices evaluate civil disability schemes that are not clearly designed to suppress
speech or to prevent destruction of the government, they might well reach different
conclusions as to the law's constitutionality. These different results would reflect
varied conceptions of the significance of the danger faced and the degree of
incremental protection that the challenged law affords. Moreover, some Justices may,
as a general rule, be more deferential to the legislature than are others. But the
application of the balancing test and the doctrine of overbreadth in civil disability
cases ordinarily reflects these differences in appreciation of the underlying facts
rather than a disagreement over the principle involved.
This relationship between the doctrine of overbreadth and the balancing
analysis is illustrated in other areas as well. See, for example, Chief Justice Burger's
dissent in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). The Election Practices Act required
political committees to record the names of all persons making political contributions
of $10 or more and required persons contributing over $100 to report their
contributions to the Federal Election Commission. Chief Justice Burger condemned
these low dollar thresholds. He believed that the governmental interest in the
disclosure of such small gifts was insufficient to overcome the first amendment
interests at stake.
To argue that a 1976 contribution of $10 or $100 entails a risk of corruption or
its appearance is simply too extravagant to be maintained. No public right to
know justifies the compelled disclosure of such contributions, at the risk of
discouraging them. There is, in short, no relation whatever between the
means used and the legitimate goal of ventilating possible undue influence.
Congress has used a shotgun to kill wrens as well as hawks.
Id. at 239.
While the majority referred to the challenge to the dollar thresholds as an
overbreadth attack, its argument, as well as the Chief Justice's, was couched in
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Application of the overbreadth doctrine is more problematic
when a statute prescribes a criminal penalty. In these instances, the
conflict between acceptable applications of the law and its unaccept-
able chilling effect on speech is most stark. Clearly, the state has a
need to prevent outrageous behavior which it properly defines as
criminal. Yet, when a statute enacted to control criminal conduct is
subsequently held fatally overbroad, the state would be forced to free
everyone imprisoned under it. Moreover, ex post facto concerns
would prevent the prosecution of persons whose acts occurred prior
to the adoption of a valid statute. Nevertheless, the Court has used
overbreadth to invalidate criminal statutes which act to proscribe
conduct a state has a clear interest in regulating.
In Coates v. City of Cincinnati,120 the Court reversed convictions
under an ordinance making it a criminal offense for "three or more
persons to assemble . . .on any of the sidewalks . . .and there
conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by
.... "121 Justice Stewart, speaking for five members of the Court,
considered it immaterial that the record contained insufficient
information to determine whether Coates' conduct was within the
power of a state to punish. He held that the statute on its face was
both vague and overbroad.
The First and Fourteenth Amendments do not permit a State to
make criminal the exercise of the right of assembly simply
because its exercise may be "annoying" to some people .... We
need not lament that we do not have before us the details of the
conduct found to be annoying. It is the ordinance on its face that
sets the standard of conduct and warns against transgression.
The details of the offense could no more serve to validate this
ordinance than could the details of an offense charged under an
ordinance suspending unconditionally the right of assembly and
free speech. 22
balancing terms. The majority agreed that "the $10 and $100 thresholds are indeed
low," but stated that "we cannot require Congress to establish that it has chosen the
highest reasonable threshold." Id. at 83. The majority noted that dollar lines are
inherently arbitrary and that there was no suggestion the low threshold was intended
to curtail contributions. Further, the majority pointed out the $100 limit does serve
informational purposes and aids in enforcement of other provisions of law that limit
aggregate sums. Where disclosure would result in subjecting contributors to threats
and harassment, the Court left open the possibility of individual exemptions to the
law.
120. 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
121. Id. at 611 (quoting CINCINNATI, OHIO, CODE OF ORDINANCES § 901-16 (1956)).
The Ohio Supreme Court, when it considered the ordinance, did not substantially
limit its reach.
122. 402 U.S. at 615-16.
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A strong minority of four Justices dissented, 123 stating inter alia
that the Cincinnati statute did not purport to bar or regulate speech
as such. They noted that it prohibited persons from "'conduct[ing]'
themselves in a manner annoying to others."'124 The dissent argued
that the overbreadth doctrine should be applied only to a statute
which, on its face, regulates pure speech. Because the Cincinnati
statute regulated conduct as well as speech, they felt it could only be
judged in the context of a particular application. Since the record
was insufficient to determine its constitutionality as applied, they
would have affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio.
Three of the Coates dissenters, Justice White, the Chief Justice,
and Justice Blackmun, were joined by new members of the Court,
Justices Powell and Rehnquist, in Broadrick v. Oklahoma,125 a
decision which adopted the speech-conduct distinction of the Coates
dissent and which has been said to have taken much of the force out
of overbreadth protection. 126 The Broadrick majority upheld an
Oklahoma statute, 127 which restricted the political activities of state
civil servants, against an overbreadth challenge. The statute forbade
state employees from 1) engaging in fund raising for any political
purpose, 2) acquiring membership in any national, state, or local
committee of a political party or club, 3) being a candidate for any
public office, and 4) participating "in the management or affairs of
any political party or in any political campaign.' ' 28 The Court's
spokesman, Justice White, drew heavily from his dissent in Coates,
saying:
[T]he plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial
overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules
of practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset,
attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids
the State to sanction moves from "pure speech" toward conduct
and that conduct - even if expressive - falls within the scope of
otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state
interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful,
constitutionally unprotected conduct .... To put the matter
123. Id. at 616 (Burger, C.J., White & Brennan, JJ., dissenting) and id. at 617
(Black, J., dissenting). The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Blackmun joined in Justice
White's dissent while Justice Black wrote a separate opinion.
124. Id. at 620 (White, J., dissenting).
125. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
126. See, e.g., Note, Overbreadth Review and the Burger Court, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV.
532, 549-50 (1974).
127. The challenge was made to § 818 of Oklahoma's Merit System of Personnel
Administration Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, §§ 801-39 (West 1965).
128. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, §818 (West 1965).
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another way, particularly where conduct and not merely speech
is involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not
only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the
statute's plainly legitimate sweep.
129
Because the statute regulated "a substantial spectrum of conduct
that is . . . manifestly subject to state regulation,"'130 Justice White
believed the law was "not substantially overbroad and that
whatever overbreadth may exist should be cured through case-by-
case analysis of the fact situations to which its sanctions, assertedly,
may not be applied.' 131
Four Justices of the Coates majority dissented in Broadrick.132
Justice Brennan, speaking also for Justices Stewart and Marshall,
complained that Broadrick overruled Coates: "Coates stood, until
today, for the proposition that where a statute is 'unconstitutionally
broad because it authorizes the punishment of constitutionally
protected conduct,'. . . it must be held invalid on its face whether or
not the person raising the question could have been prosecuted under
a properly narrowed statute.' 1 33 But Justice Brennan acknowledged
that the Court has never held a statute facially overbroad simply
because it was possible to conceive of a single impermissible
application. He believed that in this sense a requirement of
substantial overbreadth has always been implicit in the doctrine. 34
Perhaps, as Justice Brennan indicated in his final paragraph, the
different views on the Court regarding the requisite "substantiality"
of facial overbreadth may merely be differences of degree:
If the requirement of "substantial" overbreadth is construed to
mean only that facial review is inappropriate *where the
likelihood of an impermissible application of the statute is too
small to generate a "chilling effect" on protected speech or
129. 413 U.S. at 615.
130. Id. at 616.
131. Id. at 615-16 (footnotes omitted). Justice White also believed that overbreadth
scrutiny has been less rigidly applied "in the context of statutes regulating conduct in
the shadow of the First Amendment. . . in a neutral, non-censorial manner." Id. at
614. Because he viewed the Oklahoma statute as regulating "political activity in an
even-handed and neutral manner," id. at 616, overbreadth analysis would be doubly
inappropriate.
132. Id. at 618 (Douglas, J., dissenting) and id. at 621 (Brennan, Stewart &
Marshall, JJ., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Douglas argued that the state could
not deprive a state employee of his right to "speak, write, assemble, or petition once
the office is closed and the employee is home on his own." Id. at 618 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
133. Id. at 632 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote and citation omitted).
134. Id. at 630.
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conduct, then the impact is likely to be small. On the other hand,
if today's decision necessitates the drawing of artificial distinc-
tions between protected speech and protected conduct, and if the
"chill" on protected conduct is rarely, if ever, found sufficient to
require the facial invalidation of an overbroad statute, then the
effect would be very grave indeed.135
Indeed, Justice White himself suggested that the Court disagreed
only as to whether the Oklahoma statute was in fact substantially
overbroad.136
Moreover, it would be incorrect to view the majority's distinction
between "protected speech" and "protected conduct" too rigidly. The
distinction simply suggests that a statute intended to regulate some
improper conduct, which incidentally restricts some expressive
conduct, is more likely to be addressing non-speech governmental
interests than is a statute directed at expression itself. The language,
history, and application of the statute may show otherwise, however,
and in that case, the majority surely will be willing to strike down
the statute for overbreadth. 37
Although the doctrine of overbreadth remains alive, even after
Broadrick,138 several recent decisions of the Burger Court indicate a
reluctance to apply it. In Parker v. Levy, 139 Howard Levy, an army
physician, was convicted by a general court-martial for violating
certain articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice which
prohibited willful disobedience of a lawful command of a superior
135. Id. at 632-33. Both the majority and the dissent appear to draw heavily from
Overbreadth Doctrine, supra note 113. The criteria of "substantial" overbreadth is
discussed there in terms similar to those used by Justice White. See Overbreadth
Doctrine, supra note 113, at 918.
136. 413 U.S. at 616 n.14.
137. As a leading student note in the area states:
When the great preponderance of applications involve activities bearing no
first amendment interests at all, the legislature has presumably been
successful in addressing a social harm which in the main is only fortuitously
related to expressive activities. The burden on expressive conduct, and a
fortiorari the burden on privileged conduct, is incidental. Lawmaking
machinery not aimed at first amendment activities may not normally be
animated by the need to focus with the precision uniquely necessary in this
area. The task of reshaping overbroad statutes is unavoidably shared by...
courts in these circumstances.
Overbreadth Doctrine, supra note 113, at 860-61 (footnotes omitted). It follows,
therefore, that when it can be shown that the effect on expressive conduct is deliberate
rather than incidental, the statute should be struck down.
138. See, e.g., Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974). In Lewis the Court
held overbroad a state statute making it a crime to curse, revile, or use obscene or
opprobrious language toward or with reference to any policeman performing his duty.
Because the statute purported to regulate pure speech, a majority of the Court felt
overbreadth invalidation appropriate.
139. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
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commissioned officer;140 "conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman;"'141 and "all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of
good order and discipline in the armed forces."' 42 Justice Rehnquist,
speaking for five members of the Court, rejected Dr. Levy's
contention that the articles were unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad.143
Justice Rehnquist stressed that "the different character of the
military community and of the military mission" required a different
application of first amendment principles in the military context. 144
While he did not preclude the possibility of overbreadth challenge in
this area, Justice Rehnquist indicated that the rationale for
overbreadth adjudication "must be accorded a good deal less weight"
in such cases. 145 Moreover, in this case Justice Rehnquist pointed out
that the challenged articles, on their face, prohibited a wide range of
conduct which could be regulated without infringing upon first
amendment freedoms. In light of their broad scope of legitimate
application, the fact that some constitutionally protected expression
might be included within the statutes' prohibition was insufficient to
require overbreadth invalidation. 146
In Bates v. State Bar147 the Court suggested another limitation
on the application of overbreadth analysis. In that case, the Court
held that Arizona's near-total ban on attorney advertising violated
the first amendment rights of two members of the state bar who were
censored for purchasing a newspaper advertisement soliciting
patrons for their legal clinic. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion
stated that it was inappropriate to apply overbreadth "to profes-
sional advertising, a context where it is not necessary to further its
intended objective." 148
[T]he justification for the application of overbreadth analysis
applies weakly, if at all, in the ordinary commercial context....
Since advertising is linked to commercial well-being, it seems
unlikely that such speech is particularly susceptible to being
crushed by overbroad regulation. . . . Moreover, concerns for
140. Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 90(2), 10 U.S.C. §890 (1970) (current
version at 10 U.S.C. § 890 (1976)).
141. Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 133, 10 U.S.C. §933 (1970) (current
version at 10 U.S.C. § 933 (1976)).
142. Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 134, 10 u.S.C. §934 (1970) (current
version at 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1976)).
143. 417 U.S. at 752-62.
144. Id. at 758.
145. Id. at 760.
146. Id. at 760-61.
147. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
148. Id. at 381.
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uncertainty in determining the scope of protection are reduced;
the advertiser seeks to disseminate information about a product
or service that he provides, and presumably he can determine
more readily than others whether his speech is truthful and
protected. 14 9
Statutes regulating commercial speech generally reflect a policy to
protect the public from misleading and deceptive advertising. 15
While the particular statute may be overbroad because it reaches
advertisements that are truthful and informative, the seller of goods
or services who makes factual misstatements or deliberately
misleads the public should know he is engaging in unprotected
speech and is violating the legitimate policy which the state
expressed through its statute. When he is scrupulously truthful,
however, he may be assured of constitutional protection and the
profit motive can be counted on to overcome any residual chill from
the overbroad statute.
Essentially, in determining whether to permit an overbreadth
challenge to a statute, the Court is concerned with whether the
unconstitutional reach of the statute suggests that the entire
regulation was motivated by a desire to suppress information and
ideas. If there is "substantial" overbreadth, it is likely that the
interest the state sought to foster was not an interest which it
constitutionally could pursue. It would thus be wrong to convict a
person for violating a law which is not an expression of a
constitutionally legitimate policy. Further, it may be unclear exactly
what the state would require if it had pursued only its legitimate
interest. For example, a state may have a legitimate interest in
maintaining quiet near a hospital, but if the statutes refer only to
disorderly conduct, no one can know whether a properly drawn
statute would limit demonstrations to fifty feet from the hospital, or
two hundred feet from it. Thus substantial overbreadth raises due
process as well as first amendment problems. 51 On the other hand,
if there are only a few isolated examples or situations in which the
statute would interfere with protected expression, drafting difficul-
ties may account for the reach. An invalidation of a specific
149. Id. at 380-81.
150. See generally, Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the
Regulation of Advertising by the F.T.C., 90 HARV. L. REV. 661 (1977). Despite the
extension of constitutional protection to commercial speech, these statutes are not
significantly threatened since they focus on transactions which themselves may be
directly regulated. See note 4 supra.
151. The absence of fair warning in statutes is a basic fifth and fourteenth
amendment violation. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 360 U.S. 451 (1939); International
Harvester v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216 (1914).
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application will be a sufficient prophylatic to assure that the statute
does not accomplish any peripheral improper goal while enabling
the legitimate state interest to be effectuated. Additionally, the
legitimate goal will be plain and give fair warning to those engaged
in unprotected activity.
Despite general agreement as to overbreadth theory, attitudinal
differences among the members of the Court remain significant. The
present majority often is willing to deny challenges alleging facial
unconstitutionality and permit statutes to stand so they may
continue to be applied to protect and regulate valid governmental
interests.152 A minority of the Court, however, would emphasize the
potential chill to protected expression accompanying overbroad
laws. Accordingly, they would rather invalidate the entire law than
attempt to protect speech on a case-by-case basis. 53 Both sides may,
in the future, be able to agree that "substantial" overbreadth is
necessary for facial invalidation, but the majority will require more
in the way of likely impermissible applications of the statutes before
finding that the overbreadth is in fact substantial.
V. VAGUENESS
As developed by the case law dealing with free speech, the
doctrines of overbreadth and void for vagueness are closely allied.
Conceptually, however, there is a difference between the two
doctrines: 54 an overbroad statute clearly forbids conduct that is
constitutionally protected while a statute that is void for vagueness
is merely unclear as to whether protected conduct is proscribed.
Functionally, however, this difference has little effect: both over-
broad and vague statutes operate to deter constitutionally protected
conduct. Even more importantly, the Court employs the vagueness
and overbreadth doctrines to achieve the same goal: requiring the
legislature to define statutorily proscribed conduct with sufficient
specificity to ensure that only valid state interests are vindicated
and free speech is not impaired unnecessarily.
152. See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
153. See, e.g., id. at 621 (Brennan, Stewart & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
154. That is, the Court speaks of them as separate doctrines although the
distinction may not exist in some instances. See Amsterdam, The Void for Vagueness
Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960); Overbreadth Doctrine,
supra note 113.
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In Grayned v. City of Rockford,155 the Supreme Court stated that
"[v]ague laws offend several important values," 156 and enumerated
those values as well as the vices inherent in a vague statute:
First, because we assume that man is free to steer between
lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person
of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what
is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may
trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented,
laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them.
A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to
policemen, judges and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and
subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and
discriminatory application. Third, but related, where a vague
statute "abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment
freedoms," it "operates to inhibit the exercise of [those]
freedoms." Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to
"'steer far wider of the unlawful zone' . . than if the
boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked."'157
In the context of the first amendment, the problem of vagueness
has most frequently arisen in loyalty oath cases. A vague loyalty
oath is particularly chilling to the scrupulous oath taker in the
exercise of his first amendment rights; thus, the Court has found it
relatively easy to demand that any vagueness be eliminated before
an individual is required to take a loyalty oath.
In Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction of Orange County,158
the Court struck down a requirement that every Florida state
employee swear in writing that he had never lent his "aid, support,
155. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
156. Id. at 108.
157. Id. at 108-09. These same defects are endemic to overbroad statutes as well,
for such statutes do not draw a line between protected conduct unconstitutionally
prohibited and unprotected conduct that may constitutionally be forbidden. See
Overbreadth Doctrine, supra note 113 at 871-75. Thus, before such a statute is
subjected to judicial scrutiny, individuals will not know whether their conduct is
properly prohibited. As a result of this close relationship between the doctrines of
overbreadth and vagueness, many Supreme Court decisions do not clearly distinguish
between them.
The problems posed by a vague statute may often *be more easily cured by
judicial interpretation than those of an overbroad statute. Yet, as with overbroad
statutes, state courts often refuse to take advantage of an opportunity to cure a vague
statute by judicial interpretation. Additionally, a statute may be so vague that no
single decision can cure it. In such circumstances, the rationale for the facial
invalidation of an overbroad statute applies to a vague statute also.
158. 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
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advice, counsel or influence to the Communist Party."159 The Court
pointed out that the language of the oath might apply to anyone
"who had ever supported any cause with contemporaneous knowl-
edge that the Communist Party also supported it."'16 The Court
admitted it would be "fanciful" to suppose that such a person who
took the oath would be prosecuted, but noted that the language was
so ambiguous that similar protected activity might indeed be
covered. 161 The Court, quoting from an earlier opinion, stated: "[a]
statute which on its face, and as authoritatively construed, is so
vague and indefinite as to permit the punishment of the fair use of
this opportunity [of free political discussion] is repugnant to the
guarantee of liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendment.' 16 2
In Baggett v. Bullitt,163 a divided Court invalidated a Washing-
ton State loyalty oath that required teachers to swear they had not
committed an act or aided in the commission of an act intended to
overthrow or alter, or to assist in the overthrow or alteration of the
constitutional form of government by revolution, force or violence.
The Court assumed that any knowing assistance to the Communist
Party might violate this oath despite the actor's innocent motives.16 4
Indeed, the majority appeared to suggest the oath might reasonably
be interpreted to include the remote assistance of teaching Commu-
nist Party members traditional curriculum subjects (e.g., reading)
that might improve their skills and thus make their future activities
more effective. 65 Justices Clark and Harlan, dissenting, argued that
assisting in the commission of an act to overthrow the government
could not reasonably be interpreted in so broad a fashion. 166 The
Court, however, felt that the Washington oath suffered from
infirmities similar to those it had found in Cramp, stating that, in
both cases, it was dealing with:
indefinite statutes whose terms, even narrowly construed, abut
upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms. The
159. Id. at 279. In a prior case, the Florida Supreme Court had interpreted the oath
to require state employees to swear they had never knowingly lent their "aid, support,
advice, counsel or influence to the Communist Party." State v. Diez, 97 So. 2d 105, 110
(Fla. 1951). The Supreme Court determined the constitutionality of the oath as
interpreted by the Florida Supreme Court. 368 U.S. at 285.
160. Id. at 286.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 288 (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)).
163. 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
164. Id. at 367-68.
165. Id. The Court even raised the possibility that analyzing and criticizing a
manuscript submitted for publication by a Communist scholar would violate the oath.
Id. at 369.
166. Id. at 382-83 (Clark & Harlan, JJ., dissenting).
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uncertain meanings of the oaths require the oath-taker -
teachers and public servants - to "steer far wider of the
unlawful zone," . .. than if the boundaries of the forbidden
areas were clearly marked .... Free speech may not be so
inhibited.' 167
In Keyishian v. Board of Regents,6 8 the Court utilized the
doctrine of vagueness to strike down an employment requirement
closely analogous to a loyalty oath. 169 A state statute made the
utterance of any "seditious" word or doing of any "seditious" act
grounds for dismissal from the public school system. The Court held
that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. Even if the statute
were confined to the utterance of "the doctrine" that organized
government should be overthrown by force or violence, it was
impermissibly vague. As the Court stated:
The teacher cannot know the extent, if any, to which a
'seditious' utterance must transcend mere statement about
abstract doctrine, the extent to which it must be intended to and
tend to indoctrinate or incite to action in furtherance of the
defined doctrine. The crucial consideration is that no teacher can
know just where the line is drawn between 'seditious' and non-
seditious utterances and acts.170
In holding that the statute was unconstitutionally vague, the Court
emphasized that:
"[p]recision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so
closely touching our most precious freedoms," . . . "[flor
standards of permissible statutory vagueness are strict in the
area of free expression .... Because First Amendment
freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may
regulate in the area only with narrow specificity."'' 71
167. Id. at 372 (footnotes and citations omitted).
168. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
169. Essentially the same law had been upheld in Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S.
485 (1952), although, as the Keyishian court pointed out, the law had not been
attacked as unconstitutionally vague in the earlier case. 385 U.S. at 594-95.
170. Id. at 599.
171. Id. at 603-04 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33, 438 (1963)).
The Court, utilizing the doctrine of "overbreadth," also struck down
requirements that barred employment of members of the Communist Party even
though membership might be without specific intent to further the unlawful aims of
the party. 385 U.S. at 609-10. The dissenters, Justice Clark joined by Justices Harlan,
Stewart and White, argued that the language of the state statute was similar to that
of the federal Smith Act upheld in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), and
thus would apparently not include mere abstract advocacy divorced from advocacy of
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And in Whitehill v. Elkins,'72 the Court struck down a loyalty
oath that required teachers to swear, "'I am not engaged in one way
or another in the attempt to overthrow the government ... by force
or violence."' 173 The Court determined that the oath was to be read
in conjunction with the Maryland Ober Act, which defined a
subversive as one,
"who commits, attempts to commit, or aids in the commission, or
advocates, abets, advises or teaches by any means any person to
commit, attempt to commit, or aid in the commission of any act
intended to overthrow, destroy or alter, or to assist in the
overthrow, destruction or alteration of, the constitutional form of
the government of the United States, or of the State of
Maryland, or any political subdivision of either of them, by
revolution, force, or violence; or who is a member of a subversive
organization or a foreign subversive organization, as more fully
defined in this article."'174
The Court pointed out that alteration of the Constitution by
peaceful revolution, as well as innocent membership in a violent
group, is activity that is protected by the first amendment. 1'7 5
Although Maryland case law indicated that if a Maryland court
were squarely presented with the issue, it would not include such
activity within the purview of either the Ober Act or the loyalty oath,
the Court determined that at the time of its decision the clauses in
question "are still befogged,"' 76 and, therefore, the taking of the oath
could not constitutionally be required. 177
action. 385 U.S. at 627-28 (Clark, J., dissenting). However, the dissenters failed to
note that the narrow construction given the Federal Smith Act by the Court in Yates
v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) would not bind state courts in their interpretation
of state statutes.
172. 389 U.S. 54 (1967).
173. Id. at 55-56.
174. Id. at 56-57 (emphasis supplied by Court) (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 85A,
§ 13 (1957)).
175. Id. at 58, 61.
176. Id. at 61.
177. Although the majority states that the Maryland oath is "overbroad," the
context of this statement demonstrates the confusion between vagueness and
overbreadth. The Court states: "It]he lines between permissible and impermissible
conduct are quite indistinct. Precision and clarity are not present." Id. at 61-62. This
is language of vagueness, not overbreadth. Yet the very next sentence of the Court's
opinion is: "[riather we find an overbreadth that makes possible oppressive or
capricious application as regimes change." Id. at 62. In this context, the overbreadth
refers to a possible interpretation of the oath and not to its only reasonable
interpretation. That is, the vagueness of the statute could lead to an application
consistent with its language that would be clearly overbroad.
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The frustrated dissenters, Justices Harlan, Stewart and White,
argued that the required oath was unobjectionable and that no
explicit language tied the loyalty oath to any other act. They
maintained "[tihe only thing that does shine through the opinion of
the majority is that its members do not like loyalty oaths."'1 78
Although the Court scrutinizes state loyalty oaths to ensure that
such oaths are not so vague as to chill scrupulous oath takers in the
exercise of their first amendment rights, the Court has not struck
down all loyalty oaths as unconstitutionally vague. In Knight v.
Board of Regents, 79 the Court affirmed, per curiam, a district court
decision that upheld an oath that required the taker to swear to
"support the Constitution[s] of the United States... and... New
York."' 8 A similar oath was upheld in Connell v. Higginbotham,1' 1
although a second part of the oath was invalidated. 82 The type of
oath validated by the Court in Knight and Connell is taken to be a
promise as to future action; 183 not a matter of belief. Requiring an
oath in a different form from that approved in Knight and Connell
has disturbed many of the Justices because the function of such
other oaths is questionable. If a loyalty oath refers to an individual's
past acts, the acts themselves are the disqualification from
employment and the oath is irrelevant. If a loyalty oath refers to
individual beliefs, it is interfering with free speech. Loyalty oaths
that refer to individual beliefs are of doubtful utility anyway since a
potential saboteur is unlikely to refuse to take such an oath. The
oath instead, as seen by the character of the plaintiffs in the cases
discussed above, may merely discourage scrupulous peaceful
dissenters from fully exercising their first amendment rights. Thus,
the slightest imprecision in a loyalty oath, resulting in the
possibility that it may apply to constitutionally protected activity,
may curtail that activity without advancing any legitimate govern-
mental interest. Since one form of loyalty oath is successful in doing
178. Id. at 63 (Harlan, Stewart & White, JJ., dissenting).
179. 390 U.S. 36 (1968).
180. Knight v. Board of Regents, 269 F. Supp. 339, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (quoting
N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 3002 (McKinney 1953) (current version at N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 3002
(McKinney 1970)). The district court determined that the oath did no more than
require "that the subscriber affirm that he will support the constitutions of the United
States and the State of New York and that he will be a dedicated teacher." Id. at 341.
181. 403 U.S. 207 (1971). The portion of the oath that was upheld required the taker
to swear to "'support the Constitution of the United States and of the State of
Florida.'" Id. at 208 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 876.05 (1965)).
182. The Court invalidated the part of the oath that required the taker to swear
"'not [to] believe in the overthrow of the Government of the United States or of the
State of Florida by force or violence.'" Id. at 208 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 876.05 (1965)).
183. See Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676, 681 (1972).
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all that a loyalty oath should do, any other form is looked at with
extreme suspicion.
Although the Court scrutinizes with extreme suspicion any
loyalty oath that deviates from the form approved in Knight and
Connell, a majority of the Court now appears to be willing to accept
greater variations from the magic language used in those cases.l 4 In
Cole v. Richardson,8 5 the Court accepted a suggestion from the
State that the additional language of an oath, promising to "oppose
the overthrow of the government of the United States ... or of this
Commonwealth by force, violence or by any illegal or unconstitu-
tional method,"'186 was synonymous with the promise to uphold and
defend the federal and state constitutions. 187 While the dissenters -
Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall - find a promise to oppose
illegal action vague, 88 the majority opinion states: "The purpose of
the oath is clear on its face. We cannot presume that the
Massachusetts Legislature intended by its use of such general terms
as 'uphold,' 'defend,' and 'oppose' to impose obligations of specific,
positive action on oath takers."' 8 9 Thus, the Court still assures itself
that the legislative aim was a legitimate one, unrelated to
expression, while giving greater latitude to the legislature in
choosing words that express that aim. As Justices Stewart and
White pointed out in a concurring opinion: "if 'uphold' and 'defend'
are not words that suffer from vagueness and overbreadth, then
surely neither is the word 'oppose' in the second part of the oath."' 9
As is true regarding the doctrine of overbreadth, the differences
between the members of the Court with regard to loyalty oaths and
the doctrine of vagueness are not differences of basic principle, but
rather are differences of application. Some of the Justices are more
willing to find clarity because they feel legislatures should have
latitude in performing admittedly appropriate legislative functions.
Other Justices are more likely to discover ambiguities because of
greater concern for the most timorous and scrupulous of the
prospective oath takers.
184. See id. at 682-83.
185. 405 U.S. 676 (1972). See also Ohlson v. Phillips, 397 U.S. 317 (1970), aff'g
Ohlson v. Phillips, 304 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Colo. 1969); Lisker v. Kelley, 401 U.S. 928
(1971), aff'g Lisker v. Kelley, 315 F. Supp. 777 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
186. 405 U.S. at 677-78 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 264, § 14 (West 1970)).
187. 405 U.S. at 683-84. "The effect of the second part of the oath ... is merely to
clarify an aspect of the obligation imposed by the first portion. Brief for
Appellant at 7-8, Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676 (1972).
188. Id. at 689 n.3 (Douglas, J., dissenting) and id. at 692 (Marshall & Brennan,
JJ., dissenting).
189. Id. at 684.
190. Id. at 687 (Stewart & White, JJ., concurring).
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Although the doctrine of vagueness has most frequently been
applied in loyalty oath cases, the doctrine also has been utilized in
other cases touching on the first amendment. In Smith v. Goguen,19'
the defendant was convicted under the contempt provision of the
Massachusetts flag-misuse statute, which, in part, punished any
person who publicly treated "contemptuously the flag of the United
States. ' 192 The defendant had worn a small cloth version of the
United States flag sewn to the seat of his tousers. In reversing the
defendant's conviction, the Court stated:
Where a statute's literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state
court interpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered
by the First Amendment, the doctrine demands a greater degree
of specificity than in other contexts. The statutory language at
issue here ... has such scope,. . . and at the relevant time was
without the benefit of judicial clarification. 193
Justice White, concurring, found the statute was not impermissi-
bly vague, but rather, clearly punished Goguen for being contemptu-
ous of the flag.194 Thus, the statute obviously violates the first
amendment as it punishes Goguen for expressing his ideas.
195
Justices Blackmun, Burger and Rehnquist dissented on the
ground that the statute, as interpreted by the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, reached only "harming the physical
integrity of the flag"'196 and not any other negative expressions
about the flag, so that it was sufficiently specific and directed
towards a non-speech interest to be permissible. One may infer that
the dissenters believed Goguen knew that his act violated the statute
and was not protected; thus the vices of vagueness did not apply to
him. 197
In Goguen, the majority's stated concern, that "contemptuous"
treatment is too vague, is a reflection of the fear that the statute will
191. 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
192. Id. at 568-69 (quoting MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 264, § 5 (West Cum. Supp.
1978)).
193. Id. at 573 (footnotes and citations omitted).
194. Id. at 584-86 (White, J., concurring).
195. Id. at 588-90 (White, J., concurring).
196. Id. at 591 (Blackmun, J. & Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 596 (Rehnquist, J. &
Burger, C.J., dissenting).
197. Cf. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974), discussed earlier with regard to the
doctrine of overbreadth. See notes 139 to 145 and accompanying text supra (the most
significant claim raised in Parker was that certain parts of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice were unconstitutionally vague; the Court replied to this claim by
stating that Levy had fair warning as to the illegal and unprotected nature of his
statements).
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be used to punish those opposed to the government. The dissent
emphasized the governmental interest in protecting the flag. Both,
however, agreed that punishment for stating contempt of the flag is
unconstitutional. The split on the Court, therefore, turns on the
Justices' individual perceptions as to whether the statute aims
primarily at punishing contempt or protecting the physical integrity
of the flag.
Recently, in Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell,198 the Court utilized the
doctrine of vagueness in striking down as unconstitutional a
municipal ordinance that stated:
Any person desiring to canvass, solicit or call from house to
house in the Borough for a recognized charitable cause, or any
person desiring to canvass, solicit or call from house to house for
a Federal, State, County or Municipal political campaign or
cause, shall be required to notify the Police Department, in
writing, for identification only.199
The Court noted that the coverage of the ordinance was unclear
because: 1) it failed to define what body's recognition was required in
order for a cause to be a "recognized charitable cause;" 2) the
meaning of "Federal, State, County or Municipal . . .cause" was
uncertain; and, 3) it was difficult to determine what groups were
included within the phrase "Borough, Civic Groups and Organiza-
tions," which the ordinance also covered." Additionally, there was
no specification of the steps to be taken to sufficiently comply with
the requirement that covered persons or groups "notify the Police
Department, in writing, for identification only. ' 2°1 The New Jersey
Supreme Court gave little guidance as to the proper coverage of the
ordinance in its opinion upholding the ordinance.
In reversing the Supreme Court of New Jersey, the United States
Supreme Court stated:
To the extent that these ambiguities and the failure to explain
what 'identification' is required give police the effective power to
grant or deny permission to canvass for political causes, the
ordinance suffers in its practical effect from the vice condemned
in Lovell, Schneider, Cantwell, and Staub.2°2
198. 425 U.S. 610 (1976).
199. Id. at 614 n.2 (quoting Borough of Oradell, N.J., Ordinance 598A, § 1(a) (July
16, 1974)).
200. Id. at 621.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 622.
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In essence, the Court held that the ordinance was unconstitutionally
vague because "'men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning."' 203 Justice Rehnquist dissented, citing the Court's
decision in Broadrick v. Oklahoma where it held that a prohibition
on state classified employees soliciting funds "for any political
organization, candidacy or other political purpose"20 4 was not
impermissibly vague.20 5 In Broadrick, the Court had emphasized the
inherent limitations in language "'with respect to being both
specific and manageably brief."' 20 6 Rehnquist posited that persons
covered by the law could assure themselves of compliance with the
law by requesting the police to tell them if the proffered notice was
sufficient.207
The necessity for requesting the police to respond to the
sufficiency of a proffered notice, unencumbered by legislative
guidelines, seems to have been particularly troublesome to the
majority. 2 8 The specifics required for adequate notification could
easily have been included in the ordinance or a regulation issued by
the police department. The failure to provide such specifics
apparently served no purpose other than to create the possibility
that the police could discriminate on a subjective basis, i.e., dislike
for the content of a particular speaker. The ease with which this
vagueness could have been cured may be the major factor
distinguishing Hynes and Broadrick.
One of the most intriguing and difficult issues posed by a
challenge to a statute on the grounds of vagueness is the standing of
the party to raise the issue of vagueness. If a statute could
legitimately prohibit various types of conduct but is not clear as to
which types of conduct it does prohibit, a defendant may object that
the vagueness of the statute did not afford him due warning that his
acts violated the statute. If a statute clearly prohibits the defend-
ant's conduct although vague as to its application to other sets of
facts, the defendant has had sufficient warning and cannot object
that his constitutional right to "notice" has been violated. This
principle of the vagueness doctrine is illustrated by Young v.
American Mini Theatres.2 9 In Young, Justice Blackmun, in dissent,
203. Id. at 620 (quoting Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
204. 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (emphasis added) (quoting OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 818
(West 1965)).
205. 413 U.S. at 632-33 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 608 (quoting CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 578-79 (1973)).
207. 425 U.S. at 635 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
208. See id. at 621-22, 622-23 n.6.
209. 427 U.S. 50, 88 (1976). The primary focus of the Court was on the legitimacy of
zoning based on the content of films and books, discussed under the rubric of "equal
protection" at notes 258 to 271 and accompanying text infra.
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argued that a zoning ordinance of Detroit, Michigan that limited the
proximity of sexually oriented businesses to each other was
unconstitutionally vague under the principles established in Hy-
nes.210 The majority found that the plaintiffs were clearly covered by
the ordinance and, therefore, they had no standing to raise the
constitutional rights of others as to whom the ordinance may be
vague.
It is where vagueness merges with overbreadth that difficult
standing problems arise. If it is unclear whether a statute forbids
constitutionally protected speech, the statute will discourage people
from engaging in that speech. Thus, although the statute does not
clearly forbid such protected speech, it has the same effect in that it
"chills" the exercise of first amendment rights. This raises the
possibility that the statute's vagueness was designed to discourage
free speech, and a statute with such an impermissible purpose
cannot be applied to anyone. Thus, allowing a person who engages
in unprotected conduct to raise the rights of others affected by the
statute may be necessary to ensure that the statute does not continue
to discourage the speech of persons too cautious to hazard the risks
and costs of suit themselves. However, even in such a situation the
Court has stated: "Nevertheless, if the statute's deterrent effect on
legitimate expression is not 'both real and substantial,' and if the
statute is 'readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state
courts,'. . . the litigant is not permitted to assert the rights of third
parties." 211
Justice Stevens, writing for the plurality, stated "we are not
persuaded that the Detroit zoning ordinances will have a significant
deterrent effect on the exhibition of films protected by the First
Amendment. ' 212 He noted that the plaintiffs had not challenged the
specificity of the definitions of "specified sexual activities" or
"specified anatomical areas" but only the lack of clarity as to how
much of the described activity is permissible before the exhibition is
"characterized by an emphasis" on such matter.2 13 "For most films,"
wrote Justice Stevens, "the question will be readily answerable. '21 4
This suggests that the deterrent effect on speech is not substantial.
He continued: "to the extent that an area of doubt exists, we see no
reason why the ordinances are not 'readily subject to a narrowing
210. "I fail to see how a statutory prohibition as difficult to understand and apply
as the 1,000 foot rule for 'adult' theatres can survive if the ordinance in Hynes could
not." Id. at 92 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 60 (citation omitted).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 58.
214. Id. at 61.
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construction by the state courts."' 215 In rejecting the standing of the
plaintiffs to raise the problem of the statute's vagueness as it applied
to others, Justice Stevens was apparently influenced by the nature of
the material.
Since there is surely a less vital interest in the uninhibited
exhibition of material that is on the borderline between
pornography and artistic expression than in the free dissemina-
tion of ideas of social and political significance, and since the
limited amount of uncertainty in the ordinances is easily
susceptible of a narrowing construction, we think this is an
inappropriate case in which the adjudicate to hypothetical
claims of persons not before the Court.216
Justice Powell's concurrence specifically repudiates any reliance
on according different treatment, for first amendment purposes, to
nonobscene erotic materials from the treatment accorded other
protected forms of communication, but agrees that the challenged
statute's vagueness did not significantly deter such speech and could
be cured by the state courts.217
Justice Stevens' opinion may have been influenced by the
commercial nature of the businesses affected. The Detroit ordinance
does not limit the production of sexually explicit material although it
does affect those who sell such material. Whatever the speech
motives of the persons creating sexually oriented materials, the
sellers are normally motivated by profit. The Court has found that
speech linked to commercial well-being is less likely to be crushed by
overbroad regulation.218 The seller or exhibitor of sexually oriented
material who seeks to appeal to the sexual appetite of the public
knows that he is covered by the ordinance and can locate his
business accordingly. If he wishes to operate at a particular location
near another such business, the desire for profit is likely to overcome
any doubts as to the applicability of the ordinance.
Justice Blackmun's dissent in Young agrees with the basic
standing principles stated by the plurality but disagrees "on the
facts" as to the effect of the ordinance on protected expression and
also as to whether an adequate narrowing construction can be
given.219
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Justice Powell concurred in the plurality's denial of standing to raise
vagueness but said "I do not consider the conclusions in part I of the opinion to
depend on distinctions between protected speech." Id. at 73 n.1 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
218. See discussion of Bates at notes 147 to 149 and accompanying text supra.
219. 427 U.S. at 95 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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When the Court voids a statute on the grounds of vagueness, it is
protecting speech that was unnecessarily threatened by that statute.
The legislature, by redrafting the statute in more specific terms, may
accomplish the same legitimate purpose it sought to accomplish with
the vague statute. But when the defects in the vague statute are not
easily curable by a redrafted statute, or, when the invalidation of the
statute will cause serious harm, the Court's belief that the legislature
was only concerned with effectuating legitimate government
interests may cause the Court to uphold the statute despite possible
difficulties of interpretation.
VI. EQUAL PROTECTION
Another ancillary doctrine that may serve to vindicate first
amendment guarantees is the principle of equal protection - a
constitutional principle established by the fourteenth amendment.22°
If a statute prohibits a particular type or method of expression in
order to accomplish certain goals, but permits another type or
method of expression that is equally detrimental to the accomplish-
ment of those same goals, in addition to being susceptible to attack
on first amendment grounds, the statute may be attacked on the
ground that it constitutes a denial of "equal protection of the laws."
When an equal protection claim is closely intertwined with first
amendment interests, the crucial question, as in all equal protection
cases, is whether there is an appropriate governmental interest
suitably furthered by the differential treatment accorded seemingly
like expressions. 221 If no such interest exists or an appropriate
interest does exist but is not suitably furthered by the differential
treatment accorded like expressions, the differential treatment will
be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause.
An equal protection challenge to governmental regulation that
affects speech is the obverse of an overbreadth challenge; yet the
Court views both in the same light.222 Overbreadth invalidates
220. Although the fourteenth amendment, and, therefore, the equal protection
clause contained therein, apply only to the states, the Supreme Court has stated that
the discriminatory effect of a law may be so unjustifiable as to violate due process
guaranteed by the fifth amendment. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). Thus,
federal laws that affect speech may be challenged through the due process clause of
the fifth amendment on grounds of denial of "equal protection."
221. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
222. The Court stated in Mosley: "The Equal Protection Clause requires that
statutes affecting First Amendment interests be narrowly tailored to their legitimate
objectives." Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 (1972). It then
supported this statement by referring to Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), which
involved overbreadth. "In a variety of contexts we have said that 'even though the
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legislation that prohibits, inter alia, protected speech; equal
protection invalidates legislation that prohibits unprotected speech
but excepts other speech that is subject to the same objections. 223 In
both instances the Court is focusing on the necessity of the
particular statute to accomplish legitimate ends. In the case of
overbreadth, the means are questioned since the same ends could be
accomplished by a more narrowly drawn statute. In the case of equal
protection, it is the end that comes into question, for if the end of the
legislation governmental interest was in fact the legitimate rather
than the impermissible one of restricting the scope of free speech,
there would be no exemption from the statute.
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District,224 the principals of the Des Moines schools adopted a policy
that any student wearing an armband to school would be asked to
remove it, and any student refusing to do so would be suspended
until he or she returned to school without the armband.225 This
policy was adopted after the principals became aware of a plan, on
the part of some students, to wear black armbands to school to
protest the Vietnam war. 226 Pursuant to the adopted policy, three
students were suspended from school for wearing black armbands to
protest the war in Vietnam.
In sustaining the student's right to wear the armbands, the
Supreme Court stated that the wearing of the armbands was entirely
divorced from actual or potential disruptive conduct by those
participating in the protest, and, that "[i]t was closely akin to 'pure
speech' which, we have repeatedly held, is entitled to comprehensive
protection under the First Amendment. ' ' 227 The Court recognized the
need for comprehensive authority of the state and of school officials,
consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe
governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued
by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more
narrowly achieved.'" 408 U.S. at 101 n.8 (1972) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. at
488).
223. On the same day that it invalidated Chicago's ordinance in Mosley, the Court
upheld an ordinance of Rockford, Illinois that forbade persons adjacent to a school in
session from wilfully "making any noise or diversion which disturbs or tends to
disturb the peace or good order of such school session or class thereof." Grayned v.
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). The Court upheld the ordinance as a valid
exercise of the city's police power and rejected arguments that the ordinance was
either vague or overbroad. Id. at 108-21. The Grayned Court invalidated a companion
ordinance that contained a labor picketing exemption similar to the one struck down
in Mosley on equal protection grounds. Id. at 106-07.
224. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
225. Id. at 504.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 505-06.
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and control conduct in the schools.228 But the Court emphasized that
in this case, the wearing of armbands was a silent, passive
expression of opinion that did not disrupt school discipline.229 Thus,
the Court stated, "where there is no finding and no showing that
engaging in the forbidden conduct would 'materially and substan-
tially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school,' the prohibition cannot be sustained. ' '230
Without explicitly so stating, the Court intimated the policy of
prohibiting students from wearing armbands to school also offended
the equal protection clause. Justice Fortas, writing for the majority,
stated:
It is also relevant that the school authorities did not purport
to prohibit the wearing of all symbols of political or controver-
sial significance. The record shows that students in some of the
schools wore buttons relating to national political campaigns,
and some even wore the Iron Cross, traditionally a symbol of
Nazism. The order prohibiting the wearing of symbols did not
extend to these. Instead, a particular symbol - black armbands
worn to exhibit opposition to this Nation's involvement in
Vietnam - was singled out for prohibition. Clearly, the
prohibition of expression of one particular opinion, at least
without evidence that it is necessary to avoid material and
substantial interference with school work or discipline, is not
constitutionally permissible.231
In Police Department of the City of Chicago v. Mosley,232 the
Court explicitly used the equal protection clause in striking down a
Chicago ordinance that provided: "'A person commits disorderly
conduct when he knowingly: . . . (i) Pickets or demonstrates on a
public way within 150 feet of any primary or secondary school
building . . . provided that this subsection does not prohibit the
peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute
.. ) "233 The Court held the ordinance violated the equal protection
clause because it made an impermissible distinction between labor
picketing and other peaceful picketing: 234
[U]nder the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the First
Amendment itself, government may not grant the use of a forum
228. Id. at 507.
229. Id. at 508.
230. Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
231. Id. at 510-11.
232. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
233. Id. at 92-93 (quoting CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 193-1(i) (1968)).
234. Id. at 94.
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to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those
wishing to express less favored or more controversial views
.... [G]overnment must afford all points of view an equal
opportunity to be heard. Once a forum is opened up to assembly
or speaking by some groups, government may not prohibit
others from assembling or speaking on the basis of what they
intend to say. Selective exclusions from a public forum may not
be based on content alone, and may not be justified by reference
to content alone.235
The Court noted that "[tihis is not to say that all picketing must
always be allowed. '236 It stated:
[U]nder an equal protection analysis, there may be sufficient
regulatory interests justifying selective exclusions or distinc-
tions among pickets. Conflicting demands in the same place
may compel the State to make choices among potential users
and uses. And the State may have a legitimate interest in
prohibiting some picketing to protect public order.237
However, the Court emphasized that the justifications for selective
exclusions from a public forum must be carefully scrutinized to
ensure that the barring of particular speech would be based on
factors other than dislike for the specific content of the speech. 238
On at least three occasions since Mosley, the Court has rejected
claims that a particular statute or regulation that affected speech
denied equal protection of the laws. In Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee,239 the decision of a
significant number of television stations to refuse "political"
advertisements was challenged on a variety of grounds, one of those
being a denial of equal protection. Many stations refused to accept
"political" advertisements because they feared the implications of
the fairness doctrine could force them to present opposing views
without charge. 240 Additionally, they feared that if a large number of
235. Id. at 96.
236. Id. at 98.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 98-99. The Court stated, specifically, that the justifications for selective
exclusions must be tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest. Id. at 99.
239. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
240. The fairness doctrine was formulated by the Federal Communications
Commission pursuant to its power to issue regulations consistent with the "public
interest." The doctrine imposes two affirmative responsibilities on broadcasters: 1)
coverage of issues of public importance must be adequate, and 2) the coverage must
fairly reflect differing viewpoints. Id. at 110-11. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367 (1969), two aspects of the fairness doctrine were challenged in the Court.
The first was the requirement that coverage of public issues accurately reflect
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political ads had to be accepted, with or without charge, it could
result in decreased viewing that would ultimately diminish advertis-
ing revenues. The Federal Communications Commission upheld the
policy of the stations by ruling that a broadcaster who meets his
public obligation to provide full and fair coverage of public issues is
not required to accept editorial advertisements. But the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that such a
refusal was an abridgment of free speech.241 The Supreme Court
reversed the appeals court and upheld the FCC ruling.
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, argued the refusal
of the broadcasters to permit political advertisements was private
action, and, thus, could not violate the first amendment which is
addressed solely to governmental actions.242 Justice Stewart,
concurring, stated, "[t]o hold that broadcaster action is governmen-
tal action would thus simply strip broadcasters of their own First
Amendment rights. ' 243 Chief Justice Burger also argued that
requiring stations to take such advertisements would enlarge
governmental control of the media, resulting in far more serious
threats to free speech than the lack of political advertisements. 244
In rejecting the respondent's equal protection claim, Chief
Justice Burger stated, "there is no 'discrimination' against contro-
versial speech present in this case. The question here is not whether
there is to be discussion of controversial issues of public importance
on the broadcast media, but rather who shall determine what issues
are to be discussed by whom, and when.' ' 245 Burger also stated that
opposing views, even if sponsors are not found and no outside organization has
developed a program. The second aspect under scrutiny was the "personal attack
rules" providing that where a personal attack has been made on a figure involved in a
public issue, the individual attacked must be given an opportunity to respond
personally. Justice White, writing for the Court, sustained these regulations:
There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Government
from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct
himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and
voices which are representative of his community and which would otherwise,
by necessity, be barred from the airwaves .... It is the right of the viewers
and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.
Id. at 389-90.
241. Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.
1971), rev'd, 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
242. 412 U.S. at 114-21 (Justices Stewart and Rehnquist concurred in this portion
of the opinion).
243. Id. at 139. Justices Powell and Blackmun found it unnecessary to decide the
state action issue, id. at 147-48 (Blackmun & Powell, JJ., concurring), while Justice
Douglas assumed no governmental action, despite his previous arguments indicating
an opposite view, id. at 150 (Douglas, J., concurring).
244. Id. at 120-21.
245. Id. at 130. Burger concluded that Congress could appropriately leave the
decision to private persons. Justices White, Powell and Blackmun joined Burger in
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the Court's prior decisions in Grayned v. City of Rockford246 and
Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley 247 provided little guidance for the
case at hand because in neither of those cases "did the forum sought
for expression have an affirmative and independent statutory
obligation to provide full and fair coverage of public issues, such as
Congress has imposed on all broadcast licensees.
248
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall in dissent, main-
tained that there is sufficient governmental action in the broadcast
industry for the first amendment to apply to the policy adopted by
the television stations. 249 Additionally, the dissenters felt that the
respondent had presented a meritorious equal protection claim.
that conclusion. Id. at 146-47 (White, J., concurring). Justice Douglas argued not only
that Congress could leave the decision to private persons, but that it was compelled by
the first amendment to do so. Douglas indicated his disagreement with the Red Lion
decision, which permitted limited governmental regulation. He stated, "I did not
participate in that decision [Red Lion] and, with all respect, would not support it." Id.
at 154. Regretfully, Douglas never discusses the effect on the first amendment of the
necessity for the government to allocate broadcast frequencies, for he focuses on
government action only as it affects existing broadcasters. He could justify this by
disputing the scarcity theory since with CATV and UHF there seem to be a sufficient
number of frequencies for all despite Justice White's contrary conclusion in Red Lion.
See generally Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflections on
Fairness and Access, 85 HARV. L. REV. 768 (1972).
246. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
247. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
248. 412 U.S. at 129-30.
249. Id. at 173-81 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan and Marshall
observed that the government conferred upon broadcasters the power to prevent
access to groups seeking to use a broadcast frequency; therefore, governmental
responsibility existed when such broadcasters refused to air political advertisements.
Id. at 177-78. In contrast to Justice Douglas, the dissenters found no abridgment of
free speech in requiring broadcasters to air political advertisements. They stated,
"[wje are concerned here, not with the speech of the broadcasters themselves, but
rather, with their 'right' to decide which other individuals will be given an
opportunity to speak in a forum that has already been opened to the public." Id. at
199-200 (footnote omitted). Acknowledging that implementation of their view would
raise problems of favoritism to the wealthy who can afford advertisements,
impairment of the fairness doctrine, and enlargement of governmental control over
content in the broadcast industry, Justices Brennan and Marshall argued that such
problems were speculative and might be met by the FCC and licensees through future
regulations. Id. at 201-04.
While the majority perceived governmental failure to regulate to be far
removed from an intent to suppress free speech, the dissent argued that the
government was simply allowing the broadcast industry to suppress free speech itself.
Thus, to a large degree, the disagreement between the members of the Court
concerned whether the governmental policy promoted or interfered with the interest in
promoting freedom of speech. As illustrated by Columbia Broadcasting System, when
the interest served by a statute (or absence thereof) supposedly is the promotion of free
speech, the Court itself will determine whether that interest is in fact promoted. In
Columbia Broadcasting System, the majority was willing to give the government the
benefit of the doubt that free speech was in fact promoted, whereas the dissenters
refused to take such a position.
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Citing Mosley and a number of other related cases as support,
Justices Brennan and Marshall concluded:
It has long been recognized, however, that although access
to public forums may be subjected to reasonable "time, place,
and manner" regulations, "[slelective exclusions from a public
forum may not be based on content alone. . . ." Here, of course,
the differential treatment accorded "commercial" and "contro-
versial" speech clearly violates that principle.25°
In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,251 the Court again
confronted the issue of whether prohibitions solely against "politi-
cal" advertisements ran afoul of the equal protection clause. The
specific issue the Court addressed was whether a city, which
operates a public rapid transit system and sells advertising space on
its buses, is required by the equal protection clause to accept paid
political advertising on behalf of a candidate for political office. In a
plurality opinion, the Court held that the city could bar such political
advertisements from its buses without running afoul of the equal
protection clause.252
In holding the ban against political advertisements did not
offend the equal protection clause, Justice Blackmun, joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist, stated:
Here, we have no open spaces, no meeting hall, park, street
corner, or other public thoroughfare. Instead, the city is engaged
in commerce .... In much the same way that a newspaper or
periodical, or even a radio or television station, need not accept
every proffer of advertising from the general public, a city
transit system has discretion to develop and make reasonable
choices concerning the type of advertising that may be displayed
in its vehicles. 25 3
The city's decision to bar political advertising from its buses was
deemed a reasonable choice designed to "minimize chances of abuse,
the appearance of favoritism, and the risk of imposing upon a
250. Id. at 200-01 (footnotes and citations omitted) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(quoting Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)).
251. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
252. In this plurality opinion, a majority of the Court found that advertising space
on transit vehicles is part of a commercial venture and is not a normal public forum.
Since such a forum by its nature is not required to be open to the public for speech
purposes under the first amendment, the Court declared that the only issue in the case
was whether the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment was offended.
Id. at 301-04.
253. Id. at 303 (emphasis added).
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captive audience. '254 Justice Douglas concurred on the basis that all
the messages posted on the city's buses are addressed to a captive
audience who are utilizing the buses as necessary transportation
and that no speaker has a right to force his message on a captive
audience. 255 Justice Douglas did not directly confront the legitimacy
of distinguishing between political advertising and commercial
advertising, but implied that no message that is addressed to a
captive audience is permissible. 256
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall and
Powell in dissent, maintained that once the city made the decision to
lease advertising space on its buses, it made the buses a public forum
to which access cannot be denied on the basis of the content of the
advertising. 257
In view of Douglas' retirement from the Court and the plurality
nature of the Lehman opinion, there is little precedential value to the
decision. Nevertheless, it should be noted that in Mosley, the speech
most likely to occur at the schools would be critical of school policies;
therefore, the reason for prohibiting all picketing except for
picketing related to labor disputes may have been to suppress
criticism of school policies, i.e., to suppress freedom of expression.
The possibility that the purpose of the prohibition against political
advertising in Lehman and Columbia Broadcasting System was to
suppress criticism of the respective government agencies was
extremely unlikely.
The most recent challenge to governmental regulation of speech
on equal protection grounds was Young v. American Mini Theatres,
254. Id. at 304. The city's objectives in barring the political advertisements were
deemed "reasonable objectives advanced by the city in a proprietary capacity." Id.
255. Id. at 307 (Douglas, J., concurring).
256. Justice Douglas stated:
In my view the right of the commuters to be free from forced intrusions on
their privacy precludes the city from transforming its vehicles of public
transportation into forums for the dissemination of ideas upon this captive
audience.
I do not view the content of the message as relevant either to the
petitioner's right to express it or to the commuter's right to be free from it.
Commercial advertisements may be as offensive and intrusive to captive
audiences as any political message. But the validity of the commercial
advertising program is not before us since we are not faced with one
complaining of an invasion of privacy through forced exposure to commercial
ads.
Id. at 307-08. Douglas had dissented many years earlier in Public Util. Comm'n v.
Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting), from a decision upholding
the bus company's practice of broadcasting radio programs in buses and streetcars.
257. 418 U.S. at 310, 313- (Brennan, Stewart, Marshall & Powell, JJ.,
dissenting). The dissent stated, "we need not decide whether public transit cars must
be made available as forums for the exercise of First Amendment rights." Id. at
313-14.
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Inc.25 8 The City of Detroit adopted an ordinance that provided that
"an adult theater may not be located within 1,000 feet of any two
other 'regulated uses' or within 500 feet of a residential area. ' 2 9 The
term "regulated uses" included, inter alia, adult bookstores, cabarets,
hotels or motels, bars, dance halls and other adult theaters.26° The
operators of two adult motion picture theaters sought a declaratory
judgment and an injunction against the enforcement of the
ordinance on the basis that the ordinance's classification of theaters
on the basis of the content of their exhibitions violated the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 261
Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, rejected the petitioner's
equal protection claim and upheld the validity of the ordinance.
Justice Stevens stated that the essence of the rule that there may be
no restriction whatever on protected communication because of its
content "is the need for absolute neutrality by the government; its
regulation of communication may not be affected by sympathy or
hostility for the point of view being expressed by the communica-
tor. '262 Stevens concluded that the Detroit ordinance did not violate
this obligation of neutrality because:
[A] line may be drawn on the basis of content without violating
the government's paramount obligation of neutrality in its
regulation of protected communication. For the regulation of the
places where sexually explicit films may be exhibited is
unaffected by whatever social, political, or philosophical
message a film may be intended to communicate; whether a
motion picture ridicules or characterizes one point of view or
another, the effect of the ordinances is exactly the same.263
Justice Steven's explanation is somewhat disingenuous. It is
highly unlikely that sexually explicit films will be used to convey
any message condemning sexual explicitness in our society. Such
films are virtually certain to urge either explicitly or implicitly a
permissive sexual ethic.
Justice Stevens, addressing the petitioners' equal protection
claim, maintained that although the first amendment protects
258. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
259. Id. at 52 (footnotes omitted).
260. Id. at 52 n.3.
261. Id. at 55.
262. Id. at 67 (footnote omitted).
263. Id. at 70. Prior to this statement, Stevens enumerated several areas in which
the Court, in previous cases, had examined the content of speech to determine if it was
protected by the first amendment and to determine how much protection the speech
merited. See id. at 65-70.
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communication regarding sexual activities from total suppression, a
state may, consistent with the first and fourteenth amendments,
legitimately use the content of movies as the basis for placing such
materials in a different classification from other motion pictures.264
Justice Stevens stated that the line drawn by the Detroit ordinance
was justified by the city's legitimate interest in preserving the
character of its neighborhoods and, that this purpose was not related
to the suppression of speech.
The City Council's determination was that a concentration
of "adult" movie theaters causes the area to deteriorate and
become a focus of crime, effects which are not attributable to
theaters showing other types of films. It is this secondary effect
which these zoning ordinances attempt to avoid, not the
dissemination of "offensive" speech.265
In other words, even though the content regulation of the ordinance
should raise questions of an intent to suppress the particular speech,
Detroit made a sufficient showing that the purpose of this legislation
was designed to control conduct associated with the concentration of
adult theatres and not to limit or discriminate against the speech
itself.
Justice Powell, concurring, emphasized the Court's findings that
the ordinance was not directed to nor did it have the effect of
suppressing speech. 266 "[lit appears that if a sufficient market exists
to support them the number of adult movie theatres in Detroit will
remain approximately the same, free to purvey the same mes-
sage. '267 Justice Powell concluded that:
It is clear both from the chronology and from the facts that
Detroit has not embarked on an effort to suppress free
expression. ... [T]he governmental interest prompting the
inclusion in the ordinance of adult establishments was wholly
unrelated to any suppression of free expression. Nor is there
reason to question that the degree of incidental encroachment
upon such expression was the minimum necessary to further the
purpose of the ordinance.
Although courts must be alert to the possibility of direct rather
than incidental effect of zoning on expression, and especially to
264. Id. at 70-71.
265. Id. at 71 n.34.
266. Id. at 77-79 (Powell, J., concurring).
267. Id. at 79.
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the possibility of using the power to zone as a pretext for
suppressing expression, it is clear that this is not such a case. 268
Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and
Blackmun in dissent, attacked the majority's reasoning as riding
"roughshod over cardinal principles of First Amendment law, which
require that time, place, and manner regulations that affect
protected expression be content neutral except in the limited context
of a captive or juvenile audience." 269 They viewed the purpose of the
ordinance, as asserted by the city, as one of "minimizing the
'undesirable' effects of speech having a particular content."270 This
purpose, the dissent maintained, was clearly impermissible under
prior decisions of the Court.271
The undesirable effects of speech having a particular content in
Young, however, were not those that flowed from acting on, listening
to or legitimating the speech. Instead, the undesirable effects were
seen as criminal conduct associated with the operation of concentra-
tions of business establishments selling sexually oriented material.
Thus, the Court felt that despite the specification of content in the
statute, the end of the statute was legitimate and not an attempt to
suppress speech.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
One approach to the guarantee of freedom of speech embodied in
the first amendment is to interpret that guarantee as forbidding any
governmental action that restricts expression. The major task for the
Court under this approach is to determine whether the individual is
engaging in speech or conduct. If he is engaging in speech, the
government may not restrict him. This objective approach may pose
serious problems of consistency for the approach's proponents and
problems of efficiency for government operations. For example, a
person who solicits another to commit murder for pay has only used
words and conveyed ideas. If the person then refuses to pay the
murderer after the crime is committed, he may claim that he has not
engaged in conduct; only speech. Under the objective approach,
either government must leave him alone - a preposterous result -
or his words must be defined as conduct rather than speech - a
268. Id. at 80-81, 84 (footnote omitted at 81).
269. Id. at 85-86 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
270. Id. at 88.
271. Id. at 87-88 (citing Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975)).
Justice Stewart concluded, "I can only interpret today's decision as an aberration,"
due to the majority's sympathy with the well-intentioned efforts of Detroit to clean up
its streets. 427 U.S. at 85 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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strained definition of speech. This suggests a trap which the Court
has studiously avoided.
An alternative approach is to rest decisions on the subjective
determination of whether the government enacted a law for the
purpose of suppressing speech. This approach is likely to provide
little protection for speech. It is improbable that the legislature will
specifically state that it is trying to suppress ideas, individual
legislators may vote for legislation for reasons that are never stated
and, in general, the ascription of a bad purpose to a body composed
of numerous people acting from many motives is difficult. In
addition, respect for a coequal body has traditionally caused the
Court to defer to legislative judgments. In view of the difficulty of
proving that the legislature was in fact attempting to suppress
speech, any deference to legislative judgment ensures that a first
amendment standard which requires a finding of evil intent by the
lawmaking body will not be particularly effective in preventing such
suppression.
The Court has chosen to interpret the guarantee of freedom of
speech to require an objective test focusing on the nature of the
state's action rather than that of the speaker. The basic tests are
balancing - whether the state interest outweighs the impact on
speech - and categorization - whether the speech affected is
protected by the first amendment. In upholding government action
which promotes interests other than the suppression of speech, the
Court allows the government to govern effectively. In order to
protect the expression of ideas, however, the Court uses ancillary
doctrines to ensure that the government has in fact focused on its
legitimate interests. The ancillary doctrines are procedural, interpre-
tive and substantive. The procedural doctrine of prior restraint
prevents the government from using procedures which affect
protected speech when subsequent punishment of illegal speech
would be adequate. The interpretive doctrines of narrow construction
and pre-emption force the government to confront the potential for
injuring free expression and determine whether such an effect is
necessary to accomplish its legitimate ends. Finally, the substantive
ancillary doctrines of vagueness, overbreadth and equal protection
all strike down laws whose structure indicates the possible intention
to injure expression although such injury is not necessary for the
legitimate governmental purposes.
In the application of these ancillary doctrines, as well as the
basic balancing and categorization tests, the Court is influenced by
the degree of likelihood that the enactment of the statute was
influenced by a purpose to suppress speech. The Justices have
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reached a broad agreement over the nature of the ancillary
doctrines, but differ on the factual appraisal of whether the
particular law is necessary to protect the legitimate scope of
government operations, or cuts too deeply into individual free
speech.
